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The Historical Background
1. How a Socialist Goveriinont Game into Being
2. The I'ederation of Republics'
3. The Soviet Character of the Russian Government

61. How a Socialist Government Canie into Bein^.
In his reflections on Today and Yesterday Maxim Gorky remarked.
"Yesterday the Socialist thought of Europe pointed the way to the
Russian people; today the Russian worker is striving for the triumph
of the European thought"."^ Russia was a very rich soil for the
grov/th of Socialism. Russia has been a country of peasants who are
illiterate, miserably poor, and for centuries do'im-trodden by the
blind, absolute Czarist governiTient . The Czar, the royal satellites
and bureaucracy, all lived on the blood of the peasantry and drained
the country of its vitality. The mass (eighty-five percent of them
were peasantry) were long seething with discontent and angry at
heart. These conditions would have produced a so-called bourgeoisie
revolution in some other countries . It produced the French Revolu-
tion of 1789 and the rei'-olutions of sxioh other countries having for
their aim the bettering of the government and such minor social
changes as abolition of privileges and titles . These very sai-ae con-
ditions in Russia produced, not a bourgeoisie, but a proletarian
revolution, for, in addition to these very sajne conditions existing
in an intensified form, there are three other conditions which de-
termined the character of the Bolsheviki Revolution.
In the first place, Russia, of all oriental countries, was
more susceptible than other countries of Asia to western thought on
account of her geographical propinquity. When Karl Marx was champ-
ioning the cause of Socialism in Western Europe, his influence
reached far and wide, and Russia was one of the counl^ries which was
inoculated with the germs of socialism. Secondly, the Revolution
caiiie after Russia had developed her modern industry to a very large
I.Soviet Russia, vol.l, no. 8, p. 2.

extent. A revolution happening "before or after modern industrialism
is established will he different in the absence or presence respect-
ively of the part played by the class-conscious worlcman. The growth
of Russian commerce and industry at the close of the nineteenth
century v/as phenomenal. Commercial activity showed a marked gain in
the 'eighties; after 1895 it developed with prodigious rapidity.
Factories began to spring up like mushrooms. Foreign capital, espec-
ially French, poured in. Between 1888 and 1906 Russia borrowed
twelve billion francs from France. The process of urbanization went
forv/ard on a scale steeply graduated upward. In the thirty years
between 1867 and 1897 Lodz increased her population by 872^, Vladi-
kavkaz 1205. 6^!, Ivanovo-Vosnesenk 3896. 2;^^.- The guiding hand of
Russian industrialism was De Witte. But this new industrialism was
only another form of exploitation and created the Russian proletarian
working class v;ho were the immediate supporters of the distinctly
socialistic Ilovember Revolution. Thirdly, it was in Russia that the
horizontal division of society into nobility emd peasantry, privileg-
ed and unprivileged, high intellectual culture and pitch-dark ignor-
ance, in short everything and nothing, presented itself in the most
acute form. To the former the welfare of the latter was a matter of
indifference. There was no considerable middle-class such as deter-
mined the bourgeoisie character of other revolutions. The Ilovember
of a
revolution was a task accomplished by men who were the do7m-trodden^
bourgeoisie society, nothing but a complete upsetting of the old
and the creating of a new social order would satisfy them. These
three factors are responsible for the birth of the socialist govern-
ment of Russia. These were the tremendous forces which nothing could
2.01gin. The Soul of the Russian Revolution, p. 413.
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stop when they uere set in motion. The llovember Revolution was the
inevitable result of these forces. The Revolution of March, 1917,
failed because it did not go far enough.
In this Revolution history has found another instance of justi-
fying its contention that no event of such magnitude could happen as
a mere accident; for the genesis of the Bolsheviki party showed that
this party was not the only one contaminated with socialist ideas.
"There were three principal socialist organizations in Russia,- the
socialist Revolutionary party who. accepted terrorism as a transitory
necessitj^; the Social Democratic party, pure '.'arxists, advocating
the class movements as against individual action; and the Bund, com-
posed exclusively of working Jews."^ The Bolshevists v/ho instituted
the Ilovember Revolution were formerly a faction of the Social Demo-
cratic Labor party; and they had the vision.
"His Proletarian Majesty, the workingm-an of all the Russias", is
the m.ain stay of this party. The Revolution of November, 1917, was
the culmination of the socialist movement which the Provisional gov-
err-ment and others had tried but failed to stem. The Provisional
government did not go far enough. In the words of 11. Lenine, "Before
the ITovember revolution he (the Proletarian) had never seen the
possessing, exploiting cla-sses sacrifice in his favor anything that
was really of va.lue to him. He did not believe that he would be
given the often-promised land and liberty, that he would be given
peace, that the interests of a "greater Russia" and of the secret
treaties aiming at a "greater Russia" would be sacrificed; that cap-
ital and property would be surrendered. He realized this only after
ITovember 7, 1917, when he took it himself by force and when he had
3.R. Hunter. Socialists at Work, p. 328.

to dei'end this by force against the Kerenskys, Gotz, .... and Korni
lovG."'^ Such is the source from v/hich emanates the present revolut
ionary Bolsheviki government. Socialist that government must remai
as long as they are able to hold their ground. "We, the Bolsheviki
party, have convinced Russia. ?/e have won Russia from the rich for
the poor, from the exploiters for the toilers. And now it is our
task to manage Russia."
2
. The Federation of Republics .
The nev; Socialist government of Russia is a federation of
republics. "The Russian Soviet Republic is organized on the basis
of a free union of free nations, as a federation of Soviet national
republics." Again it is said "These autonomous regional unions par^
ticipate in the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic on a
federal basis. "^ The country was originally divided into four fed-
eral republics as follows:
(1) Commune of the ITorth
(2) Commune of the Yfest
(3) Central Comm.une
(4) Coraraune of the Volga
The first is composed of the governments of Petrograd, Archangel,
Viatka, Vologda, part of the govorniiient of Pskov, llovgorod, Tchere-
povetz, and Olonetz . The second comprises the governments of Vit-
ebsk, Smolensk and Pskov; the third the governments of Moscow, Orel
4:. 11. Lenin. Soviets at work, p. 56.
5 . N. Lenin. " " " , p.8
6
. Soviet Constitution, Article 1, chap.l, seo .2 , also
" 2, " 5, " 11..
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Koursk, Toula, Tver, jni-Novgorod, Voronege. The fourth those of
Kazan, Simbirsk, Saratov and Perm.'^ It is not clear v;hether other
regional republics have been established g-s the area governed has
been expanded.
The Republics were thus named as the Prench departir^ents were
named in the French Revolution, after the natural physical features
of the locality. Although it is a federation, there is a difference
bet?/een the Russian federation and the other federations of history.
The German federation came after a long period, during v/hich the
states were more or less independent, and the instinct of federation
had been nurtured by the previous confederation of the Rhine, the
north German Confederation, and the regional leagues, as the Hanseat-
ic League. The accession of the South German states after the
Franco-Prussian war was only a last step in completing the long-
cherished national desire for federation. The creation of the Swiss
federation showed the same feature. The Preamble of the Swiss con-
stitution clearly states that it is "to confirm the alliance of the
Federation and to maintain and promote the unity, strength and honor
of the Swiss nation". The Articles of Confederation of American
history codified, in a way, like international law, the already
existing practices since the establishment of the Continental Con-
gress. But in the new Russian federation there existed previously
neither the more or less independent parts nor the tendency nor
necessity to federate. The Czar's governors governed the country in
his behalf and for his interest only. There has been no tradition
and preconceived tendency looking toward federation. On the other
hand, Russia is a country of extensive territory, and as such the
regional interests differ very much from each other. The social and
7. British Parliamentary Report on Russia, no.l, 1919, p. 64.
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economic interests must necessarily find proper care in a regional
autonomous government. The several component parts of Russia all
assumed an attitude of independence after the revolution of Febru-
ar:/j 1917. In creating a federation of republics the Bolshevik
government satisfied a long-suppressed need of the political life of
Russia; and in it they found a proper solution well supported by
theories of political science.
3. The Soviet Character of the Russian Government .
In the Bolshevik government the Soviet is a fundamental feat-
ure. A Soviet is a council of soldiers or v/orkmen or their deputies.
"Russia is declared to be a Republic of the Soviets of Workers',,
Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. All the central and local power
belong to these Soviets."^ But the Soviet did not at first belong
exclusively to the Bolsheviks, only the Bolsheviks succeeded in
making it exclusively their instrument. The origin of the Soviet
dated back as far as 1905, the first revolution in Russian history.
"The idea of organizing a Soviet of workingmen's Deputies first
originated in Petrograd in October, 1905, with the Mensheviki fact-
ion of the Social Democrats. The idea was supported by the Soci9.1-
ist-Revolutionists , but met with a strong opposition from the Bol-
shevike, who styled the creation of such organizations 'the invent-
ion of semi-bourgeoisie parties to enthrall the proletariat in a
partyless swaiiip' . But the first undertakings of the Soviet organiz-
ed by the Petrograd workers met with such success among the masses
of the petrograd proletariat that the Bolsheviks had no choice but
8. Soviet Constitution, Article 1, chap.l, sec.l.
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to enter the council. The original Sovist did not last very long,
however, "being driven out of existence when the autocracy of the
Czar regained its strength. The second period of the history of the
Soviet witnessed the orga-nization of the Petrograd Soviet of Work-
men's and Soldiers' Deputies. Soviets after the Petrograd fashion
were organized in other cities and factories. In May, 1917, the all-
Russian Soviet of Peasants' Deputies was formed, one of the leaders
being the 'grandmother of the Russian Revolt'." - Catherine Bresh-
kovsky
.
The aims of these Soviets were outlined as follows :-
\^ 1. To organize the revolutionary forces of the Russian
people.
2. To organize and give expression to its political and
social demands in connection with the Revolution.
3. To give support and aid to the Provisional Government in
its task of coordinating the state machinery of the liberated coun-
try.
4. To concentrate the forces of the ?/orking classes as the
9
iTiost interested in the preservation of the newly-won liberties.
The fact that the Bolshevik party, who overthrew the provis-
ional government, retained this feature as a part of the new system
indicates its importance. All four purposes for which the Soviet
was revived early in 1917 might still be said to hold good after the
November revolution except number three, when, instead of giving
support to the Provisional Government in its task of reconstruction,
help was given to the Bolsheviki government . A Soviet in its simp-
9. Struggling Russia, vol.1, no. 3, p.39.
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lest form is a deliberative iDody. The Bolshevik government is a
pyramid of Soviets with the village Soviets at the bottom and the
all-Russian Congress of Soviets at the top. From the bottom up
there are a series of congresses of Soviets called the rural, county,
provincial and regional. These congresses, including the all-P.ussian
congress, have important features in common. They are all delibera-
tive bodies in their respective areas; the3'" elect an executive com-
mittee from among their own members; and they meet at least twice a
year. The people come into contact with the central government at
only one point by electing members to the village or local Soviets.
Rega,rding this practice the Soviet system has received much vehement
denunciation. The disposition to establish direct touch between the
elected representative and the elector in a democratic government
like the United States is ever on the increase, as evidenced by the
institution of Direct Primary Elections and the introduction of pop-
ular election of United States senators. In this respect the Russian
farmer is many times farther away from the all-Russian Congress than
the American farmer is from the United States Congress.
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General Consideration of tlie Soviet Constitution
The fundamental lav/ of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet
Republic m&Y be said to consist of two parts, six articles in all.
The two parts were adopted in different periods. The first part,
i.e., Article 1, is a declaration of rights, passed by the third all-
Russian Congress of Soviets in January, 1918. The second part,
Articles S to 6 inclusive, is the main body of the constitution, and
was adopted by the fifth all-Russian Congress on July 10, 1918. The
v;hole thing is a simple instruiTient divided into 17 chapters in 90
sections. Article 2 deals with the general provisions of the con-
stitution; Article 3, the organization of the Soviet Power, subdiv-
ided into (A) Organization of the Central Power, (B) Organization of
local Soviets; Article 4, the right to vote; Article 5, the budget;
and Article 6, the specifications of the coat of arms.
1. Declaration of Rights
The declaration of rights is one on the part of the laboring
and exploited people in contrast with the declaration of the rights
of Man and of the Citizen in the Prench Revolution. Hor is it like
the philosophical assertions of the American revolution that "all
men are created equal"? or that "life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness" are the inalienable rights of the people. It is not a
list of grievances, but is rather a list of remedies that they
believe v/ould operate to insure the rights of the proletariat and
redress their wrongs. The 'key-note is expressed by "abolition". To
abolish the existing economic and social order is the aim. "Bearing
in mind as its fundamental problem the abolition of the exploitation
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of men by men, the entire abolition of the division of the people
into classes, the suppression of exploiters, the establishment of a
Socialist Societyand the victorj!- of Socialism in all lands", "^^ is the
rating of its purpose. The remedies proposed in this declaration of
rights are:--^-*-
1) Abolition of private property in- land without compensation.
2) Abolition of private property in natural econoFiic resources,
whether animate or inanimate, all to be nationalized.
3) To insure the control of the workers over the exploiters "by
confirming the establisliment of a Supreme Soviet of National Economy,
as a first step toward nationalization of all means of production and
transportation, factories, mills, mines and railways.
4) Annullment of loans miade by the governiiient of the Czar, \)Y
the landowners and bourgeois.
5) Nationalization of banKing institutions.
6) Universal obligation to work, either mental or manual. "He
shall not eat who does not v/ork."
7) Organization of the Red Army and the disarmament of the
propertied class, to prevent the restoration to power of the exploit-
ers. This provision is the most important of all, for the Bolsheviki
regime must defend itself by force of arms
.
Then the declaration goes on to proclaim the a-brogation of
secret treaties, the principle of concluding peace without annexa-
tions t$ indemnities, the abolition of exploitation by a few nations
of the working populations of Asia and elsewhere, the independence of
10. Soviet Constitution, Article 1, chap. 2, sec. 3.
11. Same Article 1, chap. 2.
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Finland J the withdra?/al of Russian troops from Persia, and the right
of Armenia to self-detenrdnation. pinally it reiterated that" the
power must belong entirely to the toiling masses and to their plen-
IS.ipotentiary representatives" j O-eharring the exploiters from holding
positions in any branch of the government.
2 • Lack of Historical Continuity .
Thus a noticeable fact presents itself, that in this Russian
Soviet Constitution there is an abrupt break with Russia's past.
It is a challenge to the theory of historical continuity'". In the
American constitution was embodied the great body of English inher-
itance as individual liberty, political liberty, property rights,
equality before the law, and local government. The English consti-
tution affords still a better exajr.ple of the preservation of tradi-
tions and former customs, as it is # partly v/ritten gind partly un-
v/ritten, consisting of usages and customs. Thus almost every human
institution exhibits a certain degree of "historical continuity",
the blending of yesterdo.y with today. In the absence of the element
of continuity the Russian Constitution resembles the first constitu-
tion of the French Revolution. The Russian revolution resembled
much more closely the French revolution than the A.m.erican revolution.
The French constitution had nothing to back its declaration of
rights except the writings of Rousseau, Voltaire and others. The
Russian constitution has principally'' the theories of Karl Marx and
his disciples. It does not codify'" existing political traditions
that are ingrained in the habit and mind of the people. The Russian
Soviet constitution, aside from external causes of disturbance, will
18. Soviet constitution. Article 1, chap. 4, seel.
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probably suffer the sanie fate as the first French constitution.
Lenin said, "The appearance on the historical stage of a new class
in the role of a leader of society never occurs on the one hand with-
out a period of upheavals, struggles and storms on the other hand,
without a period of false steps, experiments, v/avering and hesita-
tion T/ith regard to the choice of new methods that will fit the nevj
13
objective circumstances". •
3 . Sovereifrnty .
One great q.uestion in every modern state is that of sovereign-
ty/. In the United States and other democratic governments, the
supreme power resides with the people. The Russian Soviet constitu-
tion did ^provide
y
Vno'G, that the sovereign pov;er belongs to the people,
but that it belongs solely to a certain class of people. "The entire
power within the Russio^n Socialist federal Soviet Republic, belongs
to all the working people of Russia united in urban and rural Sov-
iets. "'^'^ The authority thus established is the dictatorship of a
class, nor did they wish to deny this interpretation. "The funda-
mental problem of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federal
Soviet Republic, in view of the present transitory period, is the
esta,blisliment of the dictatorship of the city and rural proletariat
and of the poorest elements of the peasantry in the fona of a power-
ful all-Russian Soviet government for the purpose of abolishing the
exploitation of men by men and of introducing Socialism, in v/hich
there will be neither a division into classes nor a state of auto-
13. IT. Lenin. Soviets at y;ork, p. 87.
14. Soviet constitution, Article ^3, chap. 5, sec. 10.
1
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cracy. ^
4. Position of the Individual
a. Who are citizens and who are not?
Governments exist for the people v7ho live under them.
the
Thus it is alv/ays an interesting point to know the position of^indi-
vidual citizen under any form of government. This leads to the
(luestion as to v/ho is a citizen. In case of the Soviet Russia it is
also necessary to ask "v/ho is not?'' Section one of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that "all
persons "born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
Jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside" . The Russian Soviet Constitution did not
provide in uneguivocable language v/ho shall be citizens. In reality
the Bolsheviks profess internationalism.. They are Socialist-Inter-
nationalists. They aim at international revolution. They have
brothers everywhere. "The Spartacists are the German Bolshevists."-^^
The I.W.W. of the United States and the Syndicalists of ITrance all
recognized no national geographical boundary lines, and pay little
attention to the strict definition of citizenship. It cannot be
reasonably inferred that the "proletariat", the "poorest peasantry"
alone constitutes the citizenry. The fact that the capitalistic
class is deprived of voting does not mean that they are not counted
as citizens legally;" speaking, although all security and the good that
is usually associated with citizenship is reduced to the minimujn.
They become political outcasts.
15. Soviet Constitution, Article 2, chap. 5, sec. 9.
16. American Political Science Review, August, 1919.

20
fa. Granting of Citizenship to :^oreigners.
On the other hand the Russian constitution readily grants
political rights to foreigners who belong to the working class. "In
conseq.uence of the solidarity of the workers of all nations, the
Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic grants all political
rights of Russian citizens to foreigners who live in the territory
of the Russian Republic, and are engaged in v/ork and who belong to
1 7the working class." Also under this constitution the local Sov-
iets were allowed to grant citizenship to foreigners. In the United
States the process of naturalization is within the competence of the
Federal government. Long years of residence have been required, at
first fourteen years, then it was changed to five years. Even under
the present law the steps are many and punctilious. The foreigner
must renounce his original citizenship and declare his intention to
reside perraanentlj'- in the United States. He r.iust not take his first
paper under the age of eighteen, and may take his paper only after
three years of residence, and his second paper at tv/enty-one years
of age; and the United States court grants the petition only after
a hearing. But in Russia all these steps are unnecessary. The
constitution provides that "The Russian Socialist Federal Soviet
Republic also recognizes the right of local Soviets to grant citi-
17
zenship to such v/orking foreigners without complicated formality".
In order to get the citizenship of the United States the foreigner
r.ust declare that he is neither a polygamist nor an anarchist. In
Russia the foreigner who expects Russietn citizenship must not be a
bourgeois. Perhaps in no country has the persecuted foreigner been
afforded more secure protection than in Russia under the Soviet gov-
IV. Soviet Constitution, Article 2, chap. 5, sec. 20.
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ernment. It has given political or religious refugees protection "by
a constitutional provision.
c . T)iTties
The duties of the citizen of the Russian Socialist Federal
Soviet Republic were clearly set down in the Constitution. In the
constitutions of some countries the duties of the citizen include
liability for military service and for tajcation. In Soviet Russia
the duties are two in nuiiber, and the provision for nilitarj'- service
is especially important. The Bolsheviki believe in the internation-
al good will of the workers, but that time is yet to coiue. The
present is a transition period. The Bolshevik lea.ders recognized
the inevitableness of counter-revolution, particularly from the
Russian monarchists, from the intrigue of the French or English
bond-holders and concessionaires v/ho wished to have their interests
in Russia li^juidated, and from the less violent socialists. Lenin
has said, "The perishing feudal nobility took revenge on the bour-
geois, which was conquering and displacing it, not only by conspir-
acies, attempts at insurrections and restoration, but also by tor-
rents of ridicule at the inability, clumsiness and blunders of the
'insolent upstarts' who dared to take hold of the 'sacred heliii' of
the state without the ancient training of princes, barons, nobility
and aristocracy for the work, - guite like the revenge of the Korn-
ilox^G and Kerenskj'-s, Gotz, Ilartovs, and other heroes of bourgeois
morality or bourgeois scepticism, on the working class of Russia for
its ' insolent ' attempt to sieze power". "^^
18. IT. Lenin. Soviets at Work, p. 28.
I
o o
It is, therefore, the duty of everj'' Russian citizen to come to the
defense of his "Socialist Fatherland", with the restriction that
"the honor of defending the revolution with arras is accorded only to
the workers, and the non-working elements are charged with the per-
19
formance of other military duties"
.
The whole structure of the Russian socialist order was based
on the theory of abolition of exploitation of man by his fellow-
creatures. Rents, interest, all banking business and manufacturing
enterprises v/hich were counted as honest businesses under the con-
stitution of other countries, and call for the highest ability, were
condemned as exploitation. To produce directly, by either manual or
mental toil, for the purpose of consumption, not profiteering, is
what is m-eant by v/ork. The Russian Soviet constitution provides
that "the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic considers work
the duty of every citizen of the Republic, and proclaims as its
20
motto: 'He shall not eat who does not work'".
d. Constitutional Protections.
One of the principal aims of a modern constitution is to pro-
tect the citizen against arbitrary exercise of power by the govern-
ment. The amount of protection afforded the citizen, not merely
against foreign foes but against the arbitrariness of the govern-
m.ent, is a fair barometer of democracy. In the Russian Soviet con-
stitution nowhere v;as to be found any such protection of the people
19. Soviet Constitution, Article 2, chap. 5, sec. 19.
20. Same sec. IS.
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against the government. The Bolsheviks thought their aroh-enemy was
the counter-revolutionists and the bourgeois; for the enemy of the
new order ruthless suppression v/as justifiable, while to the "work-
ingrrien" , "the proletariat", "the poorest peasantry", nothing hut
Justice could be done by the governrrient
,
necessarily meaning that
the government was all-wise and all-just. Yet the best-intentioned
regime is not infallible in the matter of justice, especially v;hen
the government is daeply intrenched in power and becomes invulner-
able and irresponsible. Even though the Russian government is re-
sponsible to the all-Russian Congress, injustice to the citizens can
come from an arbitrary legislature as well as from an arbitrary
executive. One great danger to the Bolshevik people themselves is
the Red Army. There are no provisions in the Russian Constitution
that "no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house
without the consent of the owner, nor in time of v/ar, but in a manner
to be prescribed by law", that no warrant shall be issued without
oath in probable cause, "particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be siezed" ; similar constitu-
^. -, . . ^ of law is also lacking. ^ ... .tional provisions for due process The individual citizen is, there-
fore, not accorded constitutional protection. The Bolshevik Consti-
tution has afforded constitutional protection, hov/ever, of one class
against the encroachment of another. Even with the abolition of all
privileges based on the recognition of ecLual rights of all citizens,
£1
irrespective of their racial or national connections,"' these egual
rights are by no means secure. On the other hand the government was
-secured against the individual and group of individuals by the pro-
Si. Soviet Constitution, Article 2, chap. 5, sec. 22.
I
vision in the Constitution: "Being guided by the interests of the
v/orking class as a whole, the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet
Republic deprives all individuals and groups of rights v/hich could
be utilized by them to the detriment of the Soviet Revolution" .'^"^
The right which might be used most effectively to the detriment of
the Soviet regime is the right "to keep and bear arms". Thus it is
possible for the Soviet government to disarm any portion of the Red
Army, any group of people, or any individual under this provision-
.
e. His Relation to Government - the maximum government
theory.
Such is the incongruity of this"higher type of democracy", with
little constitutional protection of the individual. But the Soviet
works under a principle different from anjr other type of government.
The political thought of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was
characterised by the " laizez-faire" doctrine. Jefferson, for exam-
ple, believed the governLient that governed the least governed the
best. "I have great confidence in the cormon sense of mankind in
genera,l." "Let the general government be reduced to a very simple
organization and a very inexpensive one, and a fev/ plain duties to
be performed by a few servants." Jefferson was denounced as a
radical by his opponents, the Federalists, but Jefferson wa.s not
thought of as the same radical ty^e as are the Bolsheviks. The
Bolshevik government operates under the theory of attaining the max-
imium of government. That government that governs the most governs
the best. The Russian Soviet Constitution provides for the greatest
2S
.
Soviet Constitution, Article 2, chap. 5, sec. 23.
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amount of governiiiental interference or help in the affairs of the
individual. The Russian Soviet Govermnent, under this constitution,
not only "offers assistance, material and otherv/ise, to the workers
and the poorest peasantry in their effort to unite and organize",
"but it extends its function of helping the people to the minutest
possible extent. The governi:ient gives the poorest peasantry and the
working people the necessary facilities for the printing of news-
papers, pamphlets and books, and guarantees their "free circulation"
throughout Russia. The constitution also provides for "enabling the
v;orkers to hold free meetings; the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet
Republic offers to the working class and to the poorest peasantry
furnished halls and takes care of their heating and lighting appli-
23
ances". One does not expect details such as lighting and heating
to be incorporated in fundaiiiental law, but it illustrates the Bol-
shevik theory of maximum government. They are out and out Social-
ists but not anarchists. The government extends its action to the
remotest village and its inhabitants in affairs that were considered
entirely private. Lenin has said, "Every factory, every village, is
a production and consumption commune, having the right and duty to
.... solve in its ovm way the problem of accounting in production
and distribution. Under capitalism this was the private affair of
the individual capitalist or landowner. Under the Soviets this is
34
not a private affair, but the most important national affair".
Perhaps nothing touches the life of the individual to a fuller ex-
tent than the production and distribution of wealth. If the Soviet
is a government of "production and distribution of wealth", the
23. Soviet Constitution, Article 2, chap. 5, sec. 15.
24. II. Lenin. Soviets at Work, p.26.

ainoTint played "by the governrrient reaches the maximum and the part
played ty the individual the minimum. Upon this principle the Sov-
iet system is based.
5 . How Amended ?
A constitution ma,y be tested in the last instance by the method
by which it may be amended. In the United States a constitutional
amendment may be proposed either by the United States Congress or by
a Constitutional Convention, and ratified by three fourths of the
states, either through \,lie state legislatures or through special
conventions in the states. This method is clearly set down in the
Constitution itself, so as to provide a method by which this funda-
mental instTument may be made to suit the needs of the timies. But
in the Russian Constitution there is no provision to show how the
fundamental law may be amended. As it was adopted by two of the
all-Russian Congresses, which is equivalent in function to the Eng-
lish Parliament, the Russian method is similar to the English in
allowing all-competency to the parliament in the sense that it can
do anything that is not physically impossible. All Russian Soviet
Congresses may thus ajnend it as they see fit. There is in Russia no
court similar to the American Supreme Court to declare any law un-
constitutional, but there is also no political tradition of the
English sort v/hich prevents arbitrariness and foll3^ on the part of
the parliament. Thus the nature of the all-Russian Congress is both
legislative and constituent. The merit of combining the functions
0;: Comtlning both fundamental and statutory lav; is an open ques-
tion; but countries of later constitutional development have in
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general insisted on their separation.
The lack of provision in the constitution for a definite method
of ajjiendment and the failure to include in it many very fundamental
things cause one to douot whether the Soviet Governinent meant to
regard the Constitution with the same seriousness v/ith which the
United States Government has looked upon the I'ederal Constitution.
The circui'iistances under which this Constitution was drawn up were
those of confusion and upheaval in Russia. It was in July of 1918
when the fifth all-Russian Congress of Soviets was in session that
this constitution v/as drav/n up. It was Just the time when the
Soviet government was busy building the Red Army by conscriptionj
and otherwise making preparation to protect the Revolution against
internal and external foes. The Constitution was, in a way, sm
instrument of propaganda to be used to attract people to the Red
standard. Mr. Lincoln Eyre testifies, "In the former Government
Sq.ua,re (Moscov/) , renamed Soviet Square, they have raised, in com-
memoration of the founding of the republic, a really impressive
granite column, on the base of which is imprinted in letters of
25
gold the complete text of the Soviet Constitution". But the Sov-
iet Government has gone farther than this. "The fifth Congress
instructs the People's Commissariat of Education to introduce into
all schools and educational institutions of the Russian Republic the
26
study and explanation of the basic principles of this constitution."
How energetically this is done may be seen from the section in chap-
ter 4, The operation of the Soviet Government^ with Education in
Soviet Russia. In the educational system not only have several
25. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 9, 1920.
26. Soviet Constitution as reprinted by the ITation, p.
3
i
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special schools for the teaching of Cormnunist principles "been
opened, hut these principles are also introduced into the curricu-
lums of the secondary schools. It may be expected that if things
settle down and the Soviet Governi/ient continues^ an attempt will be
made to revise the constitution, which has served its purpose as an
instrument of propaganda and temporary adjustment. The v;ay leading
to revision is wide open because the power of amendment is left to
the all-Russian Congress, ajid the procedure of amendment was not
specified in the Constitution.
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1. The Legislative Branch .
a runctions of the all-Russian Congress
The all-Hussian Congress of Soviet is the legislative organ of
the Russian Socialist li'ederal Soviet Republic. It is the repository
of the supreme pov;er of the country. The constitution provides that
"the all-Russian congress of Soviets is the supreme power of the
27Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Repuhlic" . In reality this con-
gress not only enacts all the statutes for the Republic, but also,
as has been pointed out, is the constituent convention which set up
the Russian Soviet Constitution. "As in England, the national legis-
lature itself is the designer and repairer of the' government machine.
The hand of the past does not rest, aii autocracy of death, upon the
institutions of the Soviet state. The all-Russian Soviet fashions
the instrunent of the government, and can re-fashion them at v/ill to
2 8fit the circumstance of change."^ This congress meets at least
twice a year, but special sessions may be convoked by the Central
executive corainittee upon its ovrn initiative or upon the request of
the local Soviets having not less than one third of the population
of the entire country. Since the Bolsheviki have been in power
there have been nine, or about one congress every three months.
The all-Russian Soviet Congress has another very important
function, viz., the executive. It is not a congressional t3<^pe of
government, as is that of the United States, where both Congress and
27. Soviet Constitution, Article 3, chap. 6, sec. 24.
28. The Nation, March 22, 1919, p. 422.
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the Pres3.dent claim ascendency'" and leadership in the determination
of policies. The all-Russian Soviet Congress is by no means the
product of the theory of checks and "balances. It was given "supreme
power" hy the constitution, and resembles the Swiss Federal Assem-
bly in that it elects 200 members to constitute the Central Execut-
ive Committee, which, during the interim of congresses, assumes the
legislative and executive functions and is responsible to the all-
Russian Soviet Congress as the Swiss Federal Council of seven is
responsible to the Swiss Federal Assembly.
The all-Russian Soviet Congress is a uni-cameral assembly.
Of all the western countries Russia is the first to use a single-
chambered legislature. In spite of the abuses of the United States
Senate, the suspicion of its connection with and control by privi-
leged and big business interests, President Wilson observes the
necessity for it and the political wisdom and firmness of the sena-
tors acquired through long years of service. "What gives the Senate
its real character and significance as an organ of constitutional
governrrient is the fact that it does not represent population, but
regions of the country, the political units into which it has, by
our singular constitutional process, been cut up. The Senate, there
29
fore, represents the variety of the nation as the House does not."
On the other hand, there has been much agitation to abolish the
Senate. One of the planks of the American Labor Party, ?/hich re-
30
cently emerged in Chicago, is "the abolition of the Senate". For
the Russian Bolsheviks there existed no necessity for a senate.
29. Wilson. Constitutional government in the U.S., p. 114.
30. The Hew Republic, Dec. 10, 1919, p. 54.
II
They had abolished every rank, no class being allowed to participate
in political life except the poorest peasantry and the v/orkinginen.
Heretofore no nation has dared to abolish this upper house; it re-
mains 'vvith the Russians to make the experiment.
b Representation and Composition
The basis of representation, in the all-Hussian Soviet Congress
is different from that of other countries. The problems of repres-
enta,tion which aroused many heated debates in the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 do not seem to have confronted the Bolsheviks.
They did not take as a basis of representation the size of the popu-
lation, but they gave to the supporters of the Bolshevist regime
full representation, those whom they thought to v;in over to their
side partial representation, and the bourgeoic was excluded entire-
ly. The Bolsheviki drew their main support from the workers of the
city and their influence was weakened with the peasants as distances
separated them from the centers of the Bolshevist revolution. By
this constitution the city was given representation five times as
great as that given to the rural population, yet the great majority
of Russia's population was the peasantry. "The all-Russian Con-
gress of Soviets is composed of representatives of urban Soviets
(one delegate for every 25,000 voters) and of representatives of the
provincial congresses of soviets (one delegate for 125,000 inhabit-
ants)" This method of numerically uneq.ual representation in the
Russian Congress holds true r;ith the provincial congress b^'' giving
31. Soviet Constitution, Article 3, chap. 6, sec. 25.
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one representative to 10,000 voters of the rural districts, and one
representative to 2,000 voters of the eity. Of this method of repres-
entation the report of the Congressiontil investigation has this to
say: "Having professed an adherence to the democratic form of govern-
ment, to assist in securing control of Russia, the Bolsheviki, in
establishing its paper government, sought to maintain its dictator-
ship, under color of a representative political system. A recogni-
tion of the democratic principle that all men are created equal, how-
ever, would have necessitated the equal participation of all citi-
zens in the affairs of government. Such universal participation
v/ould have made impossible a dictatorship of the minority, but would
inherently have been a rule of the majority and would have accom-
plished just what the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was
intended to prevent. The following of the Bolshevik government being
more numerous in the cities, and these by reason of their concentra-
tion within inore restricted territorial limits being more readily
led and dominated, it was prescribed by constitutional direction that
representation from cities in government shall be five times as
great as the representation from the provincial districts. In other
words, representation from cities is in the ratio of one to every
2 5,000 of population, while from the rural districts and the terri-
tory of the peasants, who constitute a large percentage of the Rus-
sian population, representation is one to every 185,000 of the popu-
lation."^^
When the fourth all-Russian Congress was convoked there were
1084 delegates with a deciding vote, and 80 delegates with a con-
32. U.S. Congressional Record, 1919, p. 1211.
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suiting vote. They Toelonged to the different parties as follows:
Bolsheviks 732; Left Social-Revolutionists 238; Anarchists 14;
Unionists 24; Social Democrat Internationalists 16; Social Democrat
Ukraines 3; non-Partisan 18; Social Revolutionists Center 15; Social
Revolutionists Maximalists 24. The Congress, upon opening, immedi-
ately elected a Mandate Commission, whose function v/as to examine
into the credentials of the delegates, a task similar to that per-
formed by the Committee on Credentials of an American national party
convention. This Mandate Commission was composed of one member for
every 100 delegates present and one for any fraction thereof above
20 delegates. At the close of the Congress there were 1198 dele-
33
gates seated as members.
It was also claimed by the Bolsheviks that they had achieved
in the matter of representation what had for years baffled the lead-
ing American and European political scientists and statesmen^ viz.,
the recognition of occupational representation as v/ell as territor-
ial. The delegates came primarily from the "shop", secondarily from
the "map" . There has no doubt been a widespread and keen desire to
achieve some sort of occupational representation. "For years for-
ward-looking American political scientists have realized this and
have talked of the substitution of economic for geographical repres-
entation as the only reasonable rem.edy. Men's interests, they have
said, are essentially economic. People are bound together more
closely by their occupations than by the neighborhood in which they
happen to live. It might well be that legislative bodies represent-
ing different economic interests, instead of districts arbitrarily
33. The nation, Sept. 6, 1919, p.348.
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assigned on the raap, would give more adequate expression of public
opinion, and would bring the legislator into more constant and inti-
24
mate relations v/ith those he represents." It was very natural for
the Bolsheviks to apply this principle. The political individual is
the worker, who must usually be a worker of some farm or factory.
Delegates from city soviets were elected not by the American method
c£ wards, which has proved so baneful to the American municipal gov-
ernment, nor on a general ticket, but from the different trades or
occupations. There were the textile union, the coachmen's union,
the teachers' union, union of postal clerks,- in short, all kinds of
unions of the trades. The Bolsheviki thus made their representation
fundamentally'" functional and secondarily'- geographical. This desire
to change parliainentary representation from a geographical to a
functional basis has been manifested also in other countries, notably
in England. The national Industrial Conference called by the British
government in Jajiuary, 1S19, proposed, among other things, the crea-
tion of a National Industrial Council of 400, to be presided over by
the Minister of Labor and to meet twice a year, a standing committee
to meet once a month. This Council v/as to deal v/ith all q.uestions of
labor and capital, and was to be the normal organ through which the
government will get into touch with the country's industrial situa-
tion. This amounts to a devolution of that economic and industrial
part of the parliament's function, with which they thought the Par-
liament was incompetent to deal. The Parliament was to give final
sanction. There was a very close resemblance in the method of repres-
entation for the all-Russian Congress and that suggested for the
34. The nation, March 22, 1919, p. 423.

proposed British National Industrial Council.
c Pov/ers of the all-Russian Congress.
The powers of the all-Russian Congress may loe classified under
two headings, namely, those over which the Congress has sole juris-
diction, and those which the Congress holds in common with the Cen-
tral Executive Coiimiittee, which exercises these powers when the
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Congress is not in session.
1. Powers over which the all-Russian Congress has sole
Jurisdiction
a. Ratification and amendment of the fundamental
principles of the soviet constitution.
b. Ratification of the peace treaties.
2. Powers ¥;hich the all-Russian Congress holds in comon
with the Central Executive Committee
a. Constituent
1. Ratification and amendment of the consti-
tution of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
b. General direction
1. General direction of the entire interior
and foreign policy of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
c. Territorial
1. Establishing and changing boundaries, also
ceding territory belonging to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet
Republic
.
35. Soviet Constitution, Article 3, chap. 9.
It.
S. EstalDlishing boundaries for regional
Soviet unions belonging to the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet
Republic, also settling disputes among them.
3. Admission of new members to the Russian
Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, and recognition of the secession
of any parts of it.
4. General administrative division of the
territory of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic eind the
approval of regional unions.
d. Economic
1. Establishing and changing weights, meas-
ures, and money denominations in the Russian Socialist Federal Sov-
iet Republic.
2 . Working out a basis and a general plan for
the national economy and for its various branches in the Russian
Socialist Federal Soviet Republic.
e. Financial
1.Approving the budget of the Russian Social-
ist Federal Soviet Republic.
2. Levying taxes and establishing the duties
of citizens to the state.
f . Foreign affairs
1. Foreign relations, declaration of war,
and ratification of peace trea.ties.
2. Making loans, signing commercial treaties
and financial agreements.
3. Granting and cancelling Russian citizen-
ship and fixing rights of foreigners.
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g. Judicial
1. State legislation, judicial organization
and procedure J civil and criminal legislation, etc.
2. The right to declare general and individ-
ual annesty.
h. Appointment
1. Appointment and dismissal of the individ-
ual People's Commissar or the entire council, also approval of the
President of the Council of People's Commissars.
i . Military
1. Establishing the "basis for the organiza-
tion of armed foriSes.
S. The Executive Branch .
a Functions of the Central Executive Committee
The Central Executive Comjnittee is organized under the Russian
Soviet Constitution. YJith the all-Hussian Congress it shares
supreme legislative, executive, administrative and controlling pov/-
ers. It sits during the interim "between the sessions of the all-
Russian Congresses. It is elected by the all-Hussian Congress,
which delegates the executive, administrative authority'- to it, and
to which it is responsi'ble . "Before it (the fourth all-Russian
Congress) dis"banded, a permanent executive committee of 200 members
was elected, which remained in office until the next all-Russian
Congress elected their successors. Por every six delegates there
was one member on the executive committee. Each party, according to
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its strength, was allowed to place the representatives it desired on
this coiniTilttee
. This executive corrjnittee is the real pov;er in the
Soviet government, and elects or dismisses the People's Commissars
at will".^^
t Its powers.
The pov/ers of the Central Executive Committee are provided for
in the constitution. They may he classified in five ways:
1. Executive and general. The all-Hussian Central Execu-
tive directs in a general way the activities of the Y7orl:ers* and
Peasants' government and of all the organs of the Soviet authority
in the country, and it coordinates and regulates the operation of
the Soviet Constitution and of the resolutions of the all-Russian
Congresses and of the central organs of the Soviet power. In this
way it may exercise the pov/ers of Class II under the powers of the
all-Russian Congress.
2. Legislative. By this power the Central Executive Com-
mittee exercises the function of legislation in the real meaning of
the word, namely, it considers and criticizes. The all-Russian
Central Executive Committee considers and enacts all measures and
proposals introduced by the Soviet of People's Coimnissars or by the
various departments, and it also issues its ovm decrees and regula-
tions .
3. Power of Convocation. The Constitution provides that
the all-Russian Congress is to be convoked by the Central Executive
Committee at least twice a year, and that upon the petition of not
36. The ITation, Sept. 6, 1919, p. 349.
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less than one third of the whole population of Russia, or on its own
initiative a special congress may be convoked. When the congress
meets, the Central Executive Cornnittee reports on its activity and
on general q.uestions.
4. Administrative. The all-Russian Central Executive
Committee forms a council of People's Commissars for the purpose of
general management of the affairs of the Russian Socialist Federal
Soviet Republic, and it also forms departments which are called
People's Commissariats or Administrative Colleges, for the purpose of
conducting various branches of administration. The members of the
all-Russian Central Executive Committee work in the cominissariats and
execute special orders from the all-Russian Central Executive Com-
mittee.
5. There is the group of powers which is forbidden the
Central Executive Committee, and which is reserved solely for the
all-Russian Congress. This is Class I under the Powers of the all-
Russian Congress.
3. The Administrative Branch .
a The Relation between the Council of People's
Commissars and the Commissar.
Modern political scientists have held the opinion that the
division of the functions of a govermnent into legislative, execu-
tive and judicial is not exhaustive. There ought to be added two
other functions, namely, electoral and administrative. The adminis-
trative function of government is more clearly understood as man
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attempts to run the governiTient in a more business-like way and as
the governiuent gradually enlarges its sphere of activities. The
Russian Central Soviet government features the administrative functi
ion as more or less distinct from the executive. The central admin-
istrative body is the Council of the people's Comiiiissars . It is
formed by the Central Executive Committee, to v/hich it is responsi-
ble. The people's coiiimissars who are made the heads of the comjnis-
siariats or departments are chosen by the Central Executive Comjuit-
tee. The relation between this council and the departments is in-
teresting and unique. The spirit is that the mem.bers of the council
are assigned the chief place in some department, thereby emphasizing
the collective nature of the council, and not that the heads of
departments were sumiTioned together to form the council, thereby lay-
ing stress on the individual character of each department. The
Constitution clearly provided in separate clauses that "the all-
Russian Central Executive Cormiittee foniis a council of People's
Commiissars for the purpose of general managemient of the affairs of
the Russian Socialist Pederal Soviet Republic, and it also forms
departments (People's Cormissariats ) for the purpose of conducting
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various branches" . Thus both the Council and the Commissariat are
separate creations of the Central Executive Committee. Both have
the same functions to perform, that of administration, but each is
entrusted with a different phase of the same function supplem.enting
each other, the one the general managem.ent and the other the spec -
ialized phases of the work. The motivating force is supplied by
37. Soviet Constitution, Article 3, chap. 8, sec.37.

assigning each of the People's Commissars to sone department acting
as its head.
"b The Functions and Pov/ers of the Council of People's
Coirmiissars
The Council of the People's CoiuirdssarD has the right to issue
orders, decrees, resolutions, and in general take steps for the
proper and rapid conduct of govermuental affairs. The responsibil-
ity of the Council to the Central Executive Committee is effected
hy rec[uiring that all these orders and resolutions must be immediate-
ly transmitted to the latter, which has the right to suspend or
revoke any or all of the orders and resolutions which the Council
rmy have issued. The ascendancj'' of the Central Exeigutive Committee
is further safe-guarded
. by providing that "all orders and resolutions
of the Council of paople's Commissars of great political significance
are referred for consideration and final approval to the all-Russian
38Central Executive Committee" . 3ut m.easures requiring imriiediate
execution may be enacted directly by the Council of People's Commis-
sars. The Council of People's Comirdssars is also responsible to the
all-Russian Congress.
c The People's Commissar and the Collegium.
The People's Comjnissar is made the head of some department or
Coimissariat . He has the right to decide on all questions that come
under the Jurisdiction of his comrr.issariat . But this right is not
38. Soviet Constitution, Article 3, chan.S. sec. 41.
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alDsolute. In the exercise of this right he is nnder the imniedia.te
control of the Coimoil of the People's Cormissars
,
through the Col-
legium. A Collegimn of a Comniissariat is a sort of council whose
members are appointed hy the Council of People ''s Conmiissars . The
Commissar has the right to decide on any question of that Commissar-
iat according to his own discretion. The Collegium can do nothing
to prevent him froDi exercising his discretion. But after the decis-
ion is made, he is required to report the decision to the Collegium,
which may or may not agree v;ith him. When the whole Collegium or
any of its memibers disagree with the Commissar on a certa,in question,
the Collegium reports its complaint to the Council of the People's
Comjiiissars or to the Central Executive Comunittee . Thus the action
of the Commissar, though not impeded, is v/atched at every turn by
the Collegium, which is nothing less than the ears of the Council of
the People's Commissars or the Central Executive Coirjiiittee . This
schemie allows a large amount of freedom, of action to the CoLimissar,
and at the sariie time prevents any of the Commissars fromi launching
any plan in the management of his own departmental affairs that is
subversive to the general and collective administration.
d The Eighteen Commissariats.
There are eighteen departments or commissariats in all. Of
these eighteen departments som.e correspond readily with those of
other countries. They are: Departments of foreign Affairs, Inter-
ior, Army, ITavy, Justice, Fina,nce, Agriculture, Ways of Communica-
tion, Post and Telegraph, Education, Labor, Conunerce and Industry.
Some of the departments are of a new character. They are the de-
partments of Social YJelfare, National Supplies, Steite Control,
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Suprene Soviet of national Economy, National Affairs = Public Health.
Of these new departments that of Public Health is sometimes advocat-
ed in non-Socialistic countries. It v/as one of the proposed ten
depo.rtnents for the reorganization of the government of Great Brit-
ain as drafted by the Comiuittee on governmental machinery of the
ministry of reconstruction organized by the act of Parliament July
17, 1917.
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CHAPTER 4
The Operation of the Boviet Government, 1917-1920
1. Efficiency of Public Defense
2. Economic P.econstrnction
a. Abolition of capitalism in Soviet Russia
b . Industries under Soviet government
1. Nationalization of industries
2. The new industrial administration
3. The condition of industry in Soviet Russia
4. The causes for the industrial breakdown
5. The new labor in Soviet Russia
c. Trside under Soviet government
1. The abolition of trade and its condition in
Soviet Russia
S . The hope of resumption of trade v/ith the Allies
d. The conditions of rural economy in Soviet Russia
e. The organization and functions of the Suprem.e Council
of national Economy
3. The finance of the Soviet government
4. Education under the Soviet government
5. Evolution of the CoiTiiaunist party since 1917

1. Efficienc3^ of Public Defense
Since their accession to pov/er the Soviet Governiaent has been
confronted with the very acute problem of public defense. For the
Soviet C-overninent the only way to assume the right to exist as a
governinent v/as to prove itself capable of defense by force of arms.
The conditions existing in November and December 1917 and in 1918
were most critical. The problem of demoralization was very serious.
The menace of the German army v/as temporarily staved off by the
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk v/hich v/as ratified in Moscov/ on March 14,
1918. But the nur^ierous enemies of the Soviet CrOvernment were grad-
ually rising from all sides in that year. The Allies adopted mili-
tary intervention in August. On August 5, 1918, allied troops
landed at Vladivostok in order to protect Allied 7/ar materials in
Siberia, to v/atch the German and Austrian prisoners interned in
Russia, and to aid the Csecho-Slovaks . Later in the year, on ITovem-
ber IS, at Omsk, Admiral Kolchak effected a coup d'etat, drove away
the five directors of the Omsk government, and made himself Dictator.
He was to be the "White Hope" in Siberia. In the llorth Allied
troops were already in Archsingel, in the South the armies of Denikine
and in the northwest the armies of Yndenitch were gathering. So
1918 was, appropriately speaking, the period of formation for the
anti-Bo Isheviki forces.
Por the Soviet government 1918 was a period of preparation
characterized by the utmiost of desperation. By changing its empha-
sis from international revolution to national preservation, the
Soviet govermrient rallied the strength and morale of the Russian
people about the newly organized Red Army. The evolution of the
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Red Amy v/as indeed very interesting. At first it was a voli;nteer
anriy. After the brealcdovm of the Russian amy in IGl?, immediately
before the Bolsheviki Revolution, no other method of military re-
cruiting vms possible. Leon Trotzky, the Soviet Minister of War,
said, "The ruinous breakdown of the old army, and of its whole sys-
tem of organization meant that no fighting forces could be formed
except from volunteers.... It was not until the great masses of the
old army had been absorbed into the towns and villages, and new local
military institutions set up, such as local, district, and central
recruiting and comir.isariat agencies, that a beginning could be made
39
of proceeding from volunteer corps to conscription". How fo.r and
how long did the volunteer method of recruiting continue as the sole
method, there are no statistics to shov/; but very early in the sum-
mer of 1916 the Red Army entered into the second stage of its evol-
ution. In this stage the Soviet government did two things to im-
prove the Red Army. Pirst, it instituted conscription "by which a
number of years of the laboring classes were called. It v/as to be a
proletarian army. The honor of defending the Revolution was to be
reserved principally for the workers. Simultaneously there was
instituted universal milito.rj'' training to prepare a body of reserves.
It was "during the suminer of last year (1918) when the iron ring
with v/hich the imperialists in all countries wanted to throttle us
v/as being drav/n even more tightlj'- around Russia - we v/ere forced to
hurry on our military institutions. We began by mobilizing several
years all over Russia, and by hurrj'-ing on their training and draft-
39. Current History, Hov. 1919, p. 3 10.

ing in the barracks". ' "Simultaneously with our use of barrack
units and field units, v;e are everywhere carrying on the military
training of the workers and peasants. VJe viev/ the first steps of
this imiversal training in the light of a rough preparation and an
acquireiaent of certain methods v/hich every fighter must master. This
will make further training easier when the soldier is drafted into
our regular u.nits. It has already been proved that, in spite of its
restricted operation, universal military training has been of utmost
41
use in reconstituting the army." As early as April 22, 1918, the
decree on General Ivlilitarj'- Instruction was published. On May 7,
1918, the first order was issued. In July, 19 IS, the first all-
4^
Russian Congress of Military Instruction assembled. The Red Army
thus created was estimated at various figures. At the beginning of
431919 the active army was estimated by some to be 750,000 men.
This was confirmed by the Soviet Russia, published in the United
States, that "early in 1919 the Soviet Keadq.uarters Staff already
had at its disposal a well-equipped and splendidly drilled army of
750,000 men, highly disciplined and led by experienced, trustworthy
generals and officers. An equal number of troops was prepared for
44the reserves" . These figures are given here because no figures
for the Red Arm.y for the end of 1918 v/ere obtainable. One can safe-
ly presume that at the close of 1918 the Red Army was not far from
750,000, with as many reserves.
40. Current History, llov.1919, T5.310.
41. " " Nov. 1919, p. 311.
42. Soviet Russia, v. 2, no. 14, p. 335.
43. Current History, March 1919, p. 447.
44. Soviet Russia, v. 2, no.l, p.2.

The Red Army v/as well officered. Man^r of the generals and
officers of the Czarist regime entered into the service of the Sov-
iet government. Thej'" v/ere v;ell rewarded for their services and
45their families v;ere kept as hostages to insure their good faith.
The Soviet government opened courses of instruction for officers and
created five military schools of the middle type, and there v/as
maintained also the higher grade military academy of the General
46Staff. That the Soviet army was well officered at the end of 1918
was not generally "believed, out events a-fterwards unraistakahly
demonstrated that its leadership was adeciuate.
There remained one problem - army discipline. The leaders of
the Soviet govermncnt were witnesses of the dissolution of the old
army under Kerensky. The elected committee of the regiment of that
time was Fiore powerful than the commanders and the order to advance
v/as often held up for discussion or even disobeyed. The Soviet
authorities abolished the soldiers' committees in the Red Army. The
oath of the Red Army contained a section providing "I pledge myself
45. Soviet Russia Army, officers, second to none - by Col. Henry
J. Reilly. "Hot only have many generals and general staff
officers of the old regime entered the bolshevik army, but also
thousands of line officers . They are well paid on the one
hand and on the other are shot if unfaithful. Where married,
their families are hostages for their good behaviour. In
addition it is reported that 3000 formier German officers are
emiployed, many of them being artillerymen, engineers, and
officers of other technical branches." - Chicago Daily Trib-
une, Feb .28, 1920.
46. Current History, Nov. 1919, p. 311.

Du
strictly and unflinchingly to observe revolutionary discipline, and
unhesitatingly to carry out all the orders of the commanders placed
over me by the Workers' and Peasants' Governr.ient
.
"If "by mischievous design I break this my solemn oath, then
may universal contempt be my lot, and may I be punished by the stern
47hand of revolutionary law."
With the year 191S as the period of formation of the anti-
f^oviet forces and as a period of feverish preparation bj'' the Soviet
government, the year 1919 was to becom.e an eventful one for Soviet
Russia. There vere the five fronts of Archangel, Siberia. Turkestan,
South Russia and northwest Russia. It was claimed that General Kol-
chak in Siberia had 300,000 men, Denikine in South Russia had
2 50,000 to 300,000 men, Yudenich had 60,000 men equipped and financed
by England, and the Allies in Archangel had 14,000 men. The anti-
Bolsheviki armies v/ere at first so successful that for a time the
prospect for the Soviet government seemed very dark. The three
generals Kolchak, Denikine and Yudenich all had had their meteoric
successes before their final defeats. Denikine 's army came as near
as 175 miles to Moscow. On October 10 General Yudenich started his
drive on Petrograd. Within- four days his vanguard reached the vicin-
ity of the old capital of the Czar. But one after another the Sov-
iet government defeated its enemies and put them to flight. On
Ilovember 15 Omsk, the seat of the governrr.ent under Kolchak was takenj
just three days less than one year after the coup. Kolchak was pur-
sued, and on February 7, 1920, he was betrayed aytd aurrcndcrcd 4r« 4rfee
47. Soviet Russia, v. 2, no. 14, p. 339.

51
Re(i A-Pftt-y- and executed in Irkutsk. Yudenich v/as pursued j and on
December 20 he reached Riga in Esthonia. The Esthonian government
disarmed his men. General Denikine continued his retreat to the
South. On February 8 Odessa, one of the bases of the army of Deni-
kine, v/as captured by the Red Army. It was claimed by "Soviet Rus-
sia", published in the United Sts.tes, that the Red Army at the time
of the drive in the middle of October 1919 numbered about 5,000,000
48in all. But the total v;as put at 1,800,000 at the minimum in 1919
49by some military observer. This is more nearly the true number.
Accretions to the Red Army were sometimes due to dessertions from
the enemy ra,nks. Once 40,000 of Kolchak's men went over in a body.
To the Red Army belongs a very large share of the credit of preserv-
ing the Soviet government. Hov; this feat was achieved strategically
was suimned up by a newspaper correspondent: "In spite of limited
transport facilities, a concentration was first made against Gen.
Yudenich, and operations were continued against him until he was
virtually destroyed. Admiral Kolchak was attacked next and driven
into Siberia. The last concentration was against General Denikine
;
with the result that his summer gains, which had led to the hope for
50
the fall of Moscow were taken from him." Recently the Soviet
48. Soviet Russia, v.2, no.l, p. 2-9.
49. Col. H.J.Reilly. "While various figures are given, the minimum
strength of the bolshevik army is commonly put at 1,200,000,
which number is steadily increasing. The army is organized in
accordance with modern principles into divisions.... The recent
successes against Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikine have brought
many deserters and prisoners from these great armies into the
Bolsheviki one. At one stage of the last days of Kolchak's
army, 40,000 troops surrendered without firing a shot. Thous-
ands of soldiers from the Green army, which v/as the army of the
Ukraine and fought both against the bolsheviki army and Deni-
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government has "been fighting off the Polish invasion on the West.
The fortunes of the war are not yet decided. The Soviet government
51had some reverses, and under General Brusiloff has v;on back part
52
of the area occupied by the enemy. At the time of this writing
the final outcome of the struggle is not decided. Thus far the Red
Army has fulfilled its duty in successfully defending the Proletar-
ian revolution of November 1917 by force of arms. The danger of
immediate dissolution for the Soviet govermnent, either from the
civil war or fromi the success of the invasions of foreign armies, is
temporarily if not permanently removed.
kine, also have Joined the bolsheviki army since the virtual
conquest of their country." - Chicago Daily Tribune, February
28, 1920.
50. Col. H.-J.P.eilly in the Chicago Daily Tribune, February 28,1930.
51. Poles hold off Lenin Reds on 400-mile front. V.'arsaw, March
24, 1920. - Bolshevik attacks have been launched against the
Polish line at scattered points along a front of approximately
400 miles. While the Bolsheviki have made small advances at
some places, the Poles have been holding them in check in most
sections. The Reds have been compelled to retreat from sever-
al newly acquired positions, but fighting still continues,
the Soviet troops using heavy artillery, tanks, and armoured
cars. - Chicago Daily Tribune, March 26, 1920, p.2.
52. Reds shatter Polish line. - London, May 20, 1920. Confirmation
that the bolsheviki have captured the towns of Polotski and
Lepel, in the governirient of Vitebsk, v/as given by an authori-
tative British source today. It was stated that the bolshe-
viki have advanced 30 miles in depth along a front of fifty
miles. - Chicago Daily Tribune, May 21, 1920.

JO
S . Economic Peconstruotion.
The victory of the Red Army insured proletarian supremacy, "but
economic reconstruction was a task 7/hich was infinitely more import-
ant to the Soviet government than the military success. It was also
more difficult. The attention of the Soviet government in 1918 was
riveted on the destruction of the old order and the preparation for
the comdng milite.ry struggle, while 1919 was largely a year of
battles and cariipaigns. During these years all the economic machinery
and the resources of the country were devoted to the struggle to
survive civil war and foreign attacks. There were m.any powerful
economic elements which remained to he converted to ComjnunisFi, and
which the exigency of the military situation warned the Soviet lead-
ers to handle carefully and without antagonism. Among these elements
were the farmers eind the co-operatives. Therefore, in the field of
economic reconstruction, the Soviet government has merely m.ade a
beginning during the three brief years of its existence, although
many of these beginnings are of far-reaching significance. For an
adequate survey of economic reconstruction, one will have to wait.
Little has been accomplished that can properly be designated recon-
struction. The reconstruction program and the efforts put forth are
in the process of development. They have not yet matured, and could
not so ear 13'' and easily mature in an accomiplished result such as the
military victory of the Red Army. However, I shall attempt to show
how far the development of a new coiranunist economic order has gone,
and wheror'.n the plans have failed or been abandoned.
The first step toward the new economic order was the abolition
of capitalism. On December 14, 1917, a decree was issued to abolish
53banking as a private business. Banking was declared a state
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monopoly. Only the interests of the small depositors were protect-
ed. The shares of the big financiers were confiscated by the state
without compensation. The banks were the very center of the whole
economic s3''stein, the headquarters of the control, ownership and
administration of the whole economic life of the bourgeoisie socie-
ty, which the Soviet government came to destroy.
As to industries, all the big enterprises were nationalized.
When the Soviet government caine into being in 1917, there were in
European Russia some 10,000 factories employing more than 20,000
men. These came directly under the operation of the nationalization
law. Of these 10,000
,
only 6,000 were located in the territory
54then controlled by Soviet Russia. The method used for nationaliz-
ation was direct expropriation by which they were forcibly taken
away from their capitalistic owners without compensation, and de-
clared to be the property^ of the state. The factories were put into
the hands of the workers. The workman controlled the factories
through their elected committees. The factories v/ere then run in
53. Decrees and Constitution of Soviet Russia, p. 39. This decree
was issued on the ground that it is "In the interest of the
regular organization of the na-tional economy, of the thorough
eradication of bank speculation, and the complete emancipation
of the v/orkmen, peasants, and the whole laboring population
from the exploitation of banking capital, and with a viev; to
the establishment of a single national bank of the Russian
Republic, which shall serve the real interests of the people
and of the poorer classes." The name of this ITational Bank
was called the People's Bank, which is the organ through
which the issuance of notes was effected.
54. St. Louis Post-Cispatch, March 17, 1920, p. 5. Report by
Lincoln Eyre.

the most liaphaza,rd fashion and the effioiencj^ of the workiaan de-
creased to the lowest point. There was neither order nor discip-
line. This state of affairs was true in a good part of 1918. It
was not until in the latter part of that year that the beginnings of
a unique system of organization were discernible. The outstanding
feature was the organization of each industry throughout the whole
country as a unit. There was created a national administration for
that industry. In management it was a sort of nation-wide trust.
(a)
It has the power of^management of the industry in question, (b)
finance, (c) technical unification and reconstruction, (d) stand-
ardization of the working conditions. The composition of the nat-
ional administration of a certain industry consists of representa-
tives, one third from each of the following: (1) employee, (2) the
general proletariat, and (5) the technical, scientific and commerc-
55ial groups. There are local administrations as sub-divisions of
the central administration for a given industry. The orders of the
Supreme Council of National Economy are binding on the national
56
Administrations of the several industries. This is the system
elaborated by the Supreme Council of National Economy for the guid-
ance of the Soviet governinent in economic reorganization. Indust-
rial conditions continue to be as chaotic as before. Among indust-
ries thus organized were textiles, machine construction, paper,
rubber, honey-raising, cement, coal, saw-mill, peat, salt, match,
tobacco, shoe, leather, starch, alcohol, sugar, and baking; and
55. Soviet Decrees and Constitution, p. 73.
56. Soviet Decrees and Constitution, p. 74.
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there were many others.
There was still a group of industries that were not national-
ized. These were the snail factories employing less than twenty
men. The absorption of this class of industry v/as found too imprac-
tical for the tine being. Also the small hand-crafts were not
absorbed. In fact nearly all the industries nationalizad in 1918
a-nd 1919 were re-organized according to this new system only on
paper. The actual condition of the industries of Soviet Russia
during these years is in general very m.uch worse than the picture
presented to the outside world by the Soviet newspapers. The de-
scription of the total absence of any form of production, including
57
every form of economic production, is perhaps untrue. Some writ-
ers have called the hopelessness of the industrial situation the
cardinal failure of the Soviet government as such.^^ But this atti-
tude is not justified, because the Soviet government inherited from
the Kerensky government a broken industrial organization. The truer
picture of the real industrial condition is given by Mr. J. Clayton.
His statement is a more balanced attempt to establish some causation
and to describe the actual industrial condition in Soviet Russia.
57. "Confusion and v/retched conditions generally prevail through-
out Russia, according to a report made to British and Ameri-
can representatives here (Warsaw, -larch 27, 1920) by a tech-
nical expert
. o who has spent months in Russia. There is
absolutely no wheat or flax in Russia for export, he says,
and wool is scarce, as sheep throughout the country have
been killed for food. The expert, who is a native of Russia, ~
was permitted to visit farming and manufacturing districts,
and is emphatic in declaring the task of rehabilitating the
country under the leadership of N. Lenin is hopeless." -
New York Times, March 28, 1980, p.l.
58. Kiev, May 10, 1920. Bolshevism a failure, by Col. H.J.Reilly.
Throughout the country all conditions indicate Bolshevism is
a failure. It has been unable to permanently better condi-
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Mr. John Clayton wrote: (Reval via Paris, May 17, 1920)
"Industrial Russia is dead. Two things, civil nar and the Allied
blockade, have killed it. There were many minor causes, "but those
are the prineiaal ones.... I have Just completed extensi\''e investig-
ations in lioscovj, and have added to the results through conversations
with engineers , "both Russian and foreign, who have visited other in-
dustrial districts. In Petrograd and Moscov/ nothing was being done.
In the Ural districts, I an told, there is more activity, because
the shortage of raw material probably is less acute there. But in al3
Russia, except for munitions and clothing for the army, certainly
less than ten per cent, possibly less than five per cent of the nor-
mal production is under way. In plants like the Moscow metal v;orks
and the Putiloff works and the Trengoldnik in Petrograd, I have been
told by engineers that perhaps two per cent would be the correct
figure.... Until recently, of the 25fj of the pre-war transport nov;
available, all but 29^ has been used for the army to transport muni-
tions, food, and clothing to the soldiers at the various fronts.
Ryckhoff, head of the Supreme Economic Council, told me that practi-
cally no peace-time necessities had been produced in the last two
years, but none would be produced until the civil war was liquidated.
59
and transport brought back to some semblance of order."
In the food industry the Soviet government has achieved better
results. Food is considered an industry, because the feeding of the
tions even for the workmen. There are strikes in the nation-
alized factories... Elaborate schemes regarding schools,
fret' lectures
,
orphans' hones, hospitals and the like, failed
through the mental and physical inability of the Bolshevists
to really institute and mo.intain such projects. - Chicago
Daily Tribune, May 18, 1920.
5?. Chicago Daily Tribune, May 21, 1920, p. 2.
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entire population has iDeen ijindertaken "by the govermrient . For this
purpose it has been necessar3r for the Soviet governiiient to get food
materials from the farmers and concentrate in the hands of the gov-
ernTiient. The conditions affecting the concentration of food mater-
ial during the years 1917-1919 were described by the assistant com-
missioner of food control in the following language: "During the ten
months from November 1917 to August 1918 the peasants' coimnittee
gave over only 10^ of the government's demand. During the year from
August 1 1918 to August 14 1919 we got 10,000,000 tons, representing
42^^ of the total. Since August 1 1919 the governraent has received
15,000,000 tons, with prospect of collecting 50,000,000 tons more
before next August. This represents but 85^ of the total demand by
60
the government." Similarly good results have been achieved in
the baking industry, which may be considered as a branch of the
food industry. In Petrograd four bakeries were producing 300,000
pounds of bread a da^r to feed the 1,000,000 Pet rograders in March
1920.^^
Of the two immediate reasons for the collapse of industry, one
stands out more eminently than the other. The breaking-down of the
transportation facilities is more significant than the disappearance
of labor discipline. The former is not within the power of the
Soviet government to remedy, v/hile the latter is; so one may say
that the single great factor for the industrial break-dov/n is the
lack of trajisportation facilities. Mr. Lincoln Eyre testified that
the Russian industrial crisis hinged on locomotives. Of the 30,000
60. Chicago Daily Tribune, March 31, 1920, p. 5.
61. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 13, 1920,
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pre-wa-r locomotives only 4,000 were in use. 2,500 of these were
devoted to troop and airmmnition movement. The repair facilities
were exceedingly few. Every month there were 500 locomotives which
v;ere put out of comraission for lack of repairs. An American engineer
working for the Soviet government attri"buted the industrial crisis
to six reasons: v/ant of transportation, raw material, food, fuel,
labor discipline, skilled lahor and trained executives. The first
four really were q.uestions of transportation. Transportation is,
therefore, the key to Russia's industrial recovery,
new lalpor
The^policy of Soviet Russia marks a new departure in labor
history. It also indicates the consciousness of the Soviet leaders
of the necessity for speedy industrial reconstruction. There was
63
recently published a nev/ labor code for Russia. Under this lav;
every able-bodied msin is liable to labor as he is liable to military
duty. It is a conscription of labor. Llany people denounced it as
a method to enslave the Russian worker. Mr. Jerome Landfield said
on this point, "The new labor laws of Soviet government, so far from
liberating the workman, simply place him in a condition of indust-
rial serfdom the like of which has not been known for a hundred
years... 'The most striking feature of the whole code is to be found
in Section 1 of Article 1, which provides that all citizens of the
Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic between sixteen and fifty
years of age, who are not incapacitated by injury or illness, 'shall
be subject to compulsory labor'... In order to enforce this still
further. Article 24 provides that ' an unemployed person has no
62. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 17, 1920.
63. Illinois State Register, March 3, 1920, p. 4.
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right to refuse an offer of work at his vocation, providing that the
working conditions conform with the standard fixed by the respective
64tariff regulations.'" But the Soviet government naturally viewed
the situation differently. In fact, the Soviet constitution clearly
laid down that "universal obligation to v/ork is introduced for the
purpose of eliminating the parasitic strata of society and organiz-
mg the economic life of the country".
A distinct purpose of the nev/ labor law is not only the estab-
lishment of obligation to work, but the improvement of labor discip-
line. It is the management of labor that gives its efforts effect-
iveness even under Cosmmnism. Trotsky said, "The transition to the
principle of one-man authority in the domain of adm.inistration is
absoluteljr necessary. !.!anagement by Collegiuras is a mere drunken-
ness, and is now passing and exhausting itself. "^^ Trotsky also
advocated the organization of special revolutionary labor tribunals
for the enforcement of that rigid discipline without which, he alleg-
ed, there could be no economic salvation. The third army v/as
transformed into a labor battalion. It numbered about 100,000 men.
There were three other armies similarly transformed. "The third
reserve army of the Kazan region is sending thousands of men from
the ranks to the various stations. The Viatka garrison is also send-
67ing men to the railway workshops and to clean the tracks." With
this vast supply of disciplined labor power, the economic revival of
G4. New York Times, March 14, 1920, p. 4.
65. Soviet Decrees and Constitution, p. 5.
66. St. Louis Post-Dispateh, Inarch 17, 19£0.
67. iTew York Times, February 29, 1920.
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Soviet "Russia today appears r.ore likely than it was a year a,go. The
restoration of transportation will bring untold advantages "both to
the revival of industry and trade.
Trade, both internal and external, was also declared to be a
a national affair. In foreign comiiierce the ban on private enter-
prise was more strict. The Soviet conunercial agents were in Euro-
pean countries and the Baltic countries and in America. The Sov-
iet government, through its Commissar of Commerce, Krassin, was all
the time holding very tempting offers and concessions before the
American business world. The Soviet government intended to coordin-
ate Russia's needs and her surplus, and control her imports and ex-
ports through the govermnent Commissar of Commerce and allow no pri-
68. Soviets start five trade chiefs to Paris and London. - John
Clayton. "Reval, March 4, 1920. The central administration
commissionj acting on reports by Makieff and Schmellioff
,
appointed a commission of five, with pov/er to act, to visit
Paris and London and to accept contracts to reestablish com-
merce between Russianand the Western ;vorld." - Chicago Tri-
bune, March 6, 1S20, p. 2.
In America the so-called Soviet arubassador Martens was also
the commercial agent before his deportation. Bolshevik agents
in Denmark and other Baltic states were a common occurrence.
Copenhagen is a favorite of Soviet agents. These states
depend much on Russia for trade in food-stuff.
Reds m.ust Stick to Business on Trip to Britain. London,
March 15, 1920. "Replying to a question in the House of Com-
mons today. Premier Lloyd George announced that the government
would permit the visit of a delegation from the Russian
cooperative societies subject to the right to exclude individ-
uals. Every facility would be given for the coming to Eng-
land and returning to Russia, the Premier added, but it miust
be clearly understood that the delegation would be forced to
confine its work to cormnercial lines." - Chicago Daily Trib-
une, March 16, 1920, p. 2.

vate interects to enter in. But in internal trade private busi-
ness still exists to some extent. '^'^ Although all kinds of trade was
forbidden, especially in the necessaries of life, under penalty of
fine or imprisoniuent
,
selling and buying are still going on. nostlj'-
in food-stuffs and curios of the nobility. The Soviet authorities
are said to tolerate food speculators inasmuch as the government's
supply of food in the big cities like Moscow and Petrograd was inade-
quate, and starvation would result if it v/ere not for speculative
69. Lion and Bear get ready to lie down together. London, ?!ay
£9, 1920. "Statements regarding negotiations betv;een Brit-
ish officials and Gregory Krassin, Russian Bolshevik minister
for trade and comiTierce, continue contradictory. Some insist
they involve general recognition of the Soviet government,
others that they relate merely to trade. It is generally
believed Premier Lloyd George will meet Krassin, but it is
stated that if he does so the interval will be v/holly person-
al. It is recalled here that Great Britain is not acting
alone in these negotiations, which concern the suprem.e allied
conncil as a whole." - Chicago Daily Tribune, May 30, 1920.
England Demands Pledges. London. June 3, 1920. "Trade
negotiations between the Allies and Gregory Krassin, Russian
Soviet minister of trade and comraerce, have not yet begun,
Premxier Llo^rd George told the House of Comim.ons today. Russia
must guarantee that there will be no attacks on British int-
erests in the East or at home while negotiations are proced-
ing, Lloyd George said, and must guarantee to release all
British prisoners, whether civil or m.ilitary, before negotia-
tions could proceed." - Chicago Tribune, June 4, 1920.
70. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 9, 1920.
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activity in securing food from, the country, ^vernmental allowances
of food and other necessities of life v/oru very small. Only about
40^ of the v/orkers' needs in Petrograd v/ere secured from the govern-
ment, and the remainder had to be shipped by the speculators at
extortionate prices.''"^
In the matter of foreign trade with the Allies, the Soviet
government has actually accomplished nothing. Here again the quest-
ion of transportation comes in. But Mr. R. }Tartens rightly inquires,
"Is it physically possible to trade v/ith Russia's population? Hy
replj?- is 'IIo', because the transportation system, never adequate,
during five years of war became very much dilapidated, so that is
was one of the primary causes of Russia's disastrous breakdown early
in 1917. since then three years have elapsed, and naturally not in
no
the direction of improvement." ^ There is no need to question the
desire of the Soviet government to resume trade relations with the
Allies. The assistant com.missioner of food control said, "If the
governments v/anting our surplus food will send boots, clothing, and
agricultural implem.ents in exchange, they will find the peasants
ready and eager to do business. But above ever3''thing we must have
locoFiOtives . The nedd among the Russian population is only a quest-
ion of transport"
.
But transportation is not the only thing that is in the way of
a resumption of trade relations. The Allied foreign policy is harder
for any outsider to interpret than the railway difficulty of Russia.
71. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Harch lo, 19C0.
72. R. Martens' Bulletin "Russia" for March, 1920.
73. Chicago Daily Tribune, March 31, 1920, p. 5.

Hr. Edv/in L. Janes spoke of the Allied action in this respect: "The
Allied proposal to resiuiie general cormnercial relations v/ith Russia
appears for the present lo^t in the maze of European politics. A
month ago the three Preiniers in London issued their proclamation
saying tha.t though they could not recognize the Soviet governiuent at
that time, trade v/ith Russia should be encouraged by all possible
means, nothing tangible has so far been accomplished by the Allies,
or if anything tangible has been done, it is a carefully guarded
74
secret".
In rural econorAy Soviet Russia fared very m^uch better than in
her industries during the period 1919-1920. Russia has been an
agricultural country. During the v/ar farming was not neglected to
the same extent as in I'rance, because the devastated area of her
territory v/as very small in proportion to the total, and the enor-
mous expanse of grain producing territory continued to 07?fer to man-
kind the gifts of nature. There v/as great deficiency of labor on
the farm, but the Russian women are good farm workers. During
these ^rears of v;ar, there were actually accumulations of cereals in
the granaries of Ukraine and Siberia. The lack of food in the city
of
was not because of the lack of food in the country, but because^the
breaking-down of the transportation sj^'stem.. Of the actual condi-
tion of farm produce, Mr. J. Clayton testified thus: (Moscow, March
26, 1920) "Ten million tons of grain now are awaiting the world
market v/hen the blockade eventuallj^ will be lifted, and means of
74. Hew York Times, March 27, 1920, p. 22.

transportation provided. Of this 4 j 000, COO tons are in Si'oeria and
6,000,000 tons in Ukraine. In addition to grain, there are
100,000,000 pounds of butterj 480,000,000 pounds of meats and
3,000,000,000 eggs available for the export market . "'^^
In the reconstruction of rural econoiny, land was an important
question and remains unsolved?^^ The land, according to the social-
ist theory, must "belong to the state. The Soviet government provid-
ed in their constitution that "all property rights in the land,
treasures of the earth, waters, forests and fundamental natural
resources within the boundaries of the ^Russian Federal Soviet Repub-
'7 Pilie are abolished", and that "the titles of large landed property
77
are annulled and can not be redeemed" . But the Soviet governi.ient
did not dare to take the land av/ay from the peasantry, whose support
was absolutely necessary for the preservation of the Soviet govern-
ment. Fully 80;1 of the -Russian population belonged to peasantry;
and they had an immense influence on the Soviet government. The
result v/as that land continued to remain with the peasantry and new
land was given to those who v/ere at first without it. It was guar-
anteed that "lands belonging to enlisted Cossack soldiers and peas-
77
ants are not subject to confiscation" . There have arisen since
1917 a class of rich farmers who might be called"propertied peas4-
ants" in contrast to the poor community peasants. On June 6,
1913, a large meeting was held in I!oscow. Lenin made a speech in
which he denounced the attitude of the peasant class, saying, "We
(Continued on p. 66)
75. Chicago Daily Tribune, March 31, 1920, p. 5.
76. Decrees and Constitution of Soviet Russia, p. 18.
77. Etienne Centonetti's Bolshevik Russia, p. 256.
78. " " " " p. 263-264.
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78a. The Land Policy of Soviet Russia. "After this first stage of
the agrarian revolution the Soviet Governiuent in the first half of
1918 made the first attempts at agricultural socialization. ITrom
the very beginning this work fell in two main divisions: the organ-
ization of soviet estates and the promotion of agricultural com-
munes and of other collective agricultural enterprises not under
state control. In August 5 1918, the People's Commissariat of
Agriculture published soriC principles and by-laws on the organiza-
tion of comriiunes, and on ITovem.ber 2 of the sane year the Government
by a decree created a fund of one billion rubles for loans to
collective agricultural enterprises.
The estates are supposed to be scientifically arranged m.odel
agricultural enterprises of the highest possible productivity;
undertaking such o.gricultural and industrial activities as dairies,
stock-farms 5 vineyards, v/ine presses, tea, tobacco and beet Tolant-
ations; and eauipped with experim.ental fields, agricultural schools
and exhibitions, libraries and musemns . The purpose of the scheme
is to make the soviet estates serve as large agricultural centers
for the benefit and instruction of the peasants.
The agricultural communes are collective enterprises voluntar-
ily organized by a group of producers fromi their individual land
allotments and the eguipmients of their households, or from lands
and inventories placed at their disposal by the soviet authorities;
the coFimunes are operated primiarily for the needs of their partici-
pants on the basis of an equal collective application of their
labor and comuuunal consumption of the products.
Collective cultivation of land means, in the lav/, collective
tillage, manuring, sowing and harvesting of lands by a whole village
conir.iunity or a part of its members, who for that purpose combine in
partnerships, sharing in the collective work with their ov/n labor,
inventories, and working anim.als, or with an inventory owned solely
by the partnership. Village lands not allotted to individual
households are miarked out for collective cultivation as v;ell as
private plots whose holders are not able to till theri and lands
assigned for that purpose by soviet authorities from the land
reserve
The soviet authorities and econoriists ascribe great importance
to each form of collective agriculture. The soviet estates are
conceived as the basis of a com.plete socialization of agriculture
on a national scale. The comjnunes are also supposed in the course
of tim.e to becomie nationalized enterprises; v/hile the collective
cultivation of land is regarded as a means of training the peasants
in agricultural collectivisFi and of paving the way for ultima,te
com.bination in comj;iunes. In this connection both the comjnunes and
the partnerships for collective cultivation constitute only temipor-
ary, transitory economiic organizations leading finallj?" to the com-
plete nationalization of agriculture. -
In pursuance of the principles and FiCthods outlined in the
1i
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foregoihgj the Soviet Goverrment during 1919 has organized many new
soviet estates and promoted the organization of agricultural com-
munes. The cultivated territory of the estates, numbering 2,5C4 5
comprised a little short of 1,000,000 dessiatines, of which the
whole annual produce, estimated in money, amounted to 842,000,000
rubles; it is intended to increase this territory in 1920 to
2,000,000 dessiatines. Somie inference as to the growth of the
comanunes ma;,'* be drawn from the respective data available for the
provinces of Petrograd, Novgorod, Vitebsk, Mohilev, Tula. Kaluga,
and Orel, where in the raddle of 1919 there were in existence 1,330
conuaunes with a land area of 179,000 dessiatines." - The IJation,
15, 1920, p. 646-648.
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have reached a point v/hen the pro"blem we face is incoiuparably harder
to solve than the problem of defeating the counter-revolution. We
must take over the essential products which have been siezed not by
70
merabers of the upper bourgeoisie but by nuaierous small owners"
.
Whether these small peasantry ov/ners will give up their essential
products and also their land is a doubtful g.uestion. Evidently
practical statesmanship has demanded of the Soviet leaders that the3''
maintain the good will of the peasantry and lea,ve the question of
the nationalization of the la,nd to the future. The numerous peasant
revolts against the anti-Soviet armies showed that this good will
was well preserved in 1019. These revolts in the Caucasus and in
Siberia often threatened the rear of the advancing emti-Soviet army
and helped to bring the victory to the T^ed Army.
The above paragraphs show that in certain restricted fields
of economic reeonstruction the Bolsheviks have made a promising
beginning in the direction of socializing the means of production.
The organ that has served since the very beginning to direct
the economic reconstruction is the Supreme Council of national Econ-
omy. The Council was instituted by the decree of Eecember 13, 1917.
The composition of this Council was m^ade up by the m.em-bers of the
Council of V'Orkmen's Control, the representatives from, each of the
Commissariat, and expert ad^^isers. It directs and unifies the work
of regulating the national economy. It is empov/ered to confiscate,
reciuisition, sequestrate, and sjmdicate various establishm.ents in
the field of production, distribution, and state finances. It is
divided into sections, each dealing with separate economic phases.
73. Etienne Centonctti's Bolshevik Russia, p.£63-264.
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Bills affecting national economy in its entiretj'- are brought to the
Council of People's Conmiissars through the Supreme Council of ilat-
70
ional Economy. " It issues a paper called "Eeonomicheskaya Zhizn",
which is the official orgo.n of that body.
3 . The finance of the Soviet Grovernincnt
.
The figures showing the financial condition of the Soviet
government were not made known to the outside world until quite
recently. There has been considerable guess-work as to the fina,n-
cial confusion in Russia, and the opinions given were supported by
the reasoning that financial catastrophe inevitably follovTs any
great revolution. But substantial data v/as wanting. To begin with,
the Soviet government was established in ITovenber 1917. The fig-
ures for this yea,r were not available at that time. The Soviet gov-
ernment was in power only the last two months of the year. The ex-
penditure of the Soviet government in 1918 amounted to 46,000,0005 000
80
rubles; that is an increase of 19,000,000,000 rubles over 1917.
Therefore we may conclude that the expenditure for 1917 v/aa
27,000,000,000 rubles. It is not knov/n, however, tha.t this sum
covered the entire expenditure of Russia for that year. It seems
doubtful whether during its two months of pov/er the Soviet govern-
ment had any budget at all. Sub3eg.uent information may help to
decide this point.
In 1918 the expenditure of the Soviet government for the
79. Current History, June 1918, p. 455.
80. From the Special Correspondence of the Hew York Evening Post
from Amsterdam, llovember 82, 1919.
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January-June period v;as 1? , 60S . 727^riijles, and the receipts SjSSS,
period, the expenditure was 39,074 5 194,000 rubles, the receipts
12,780,174,000, leaving a deficit of 16,344,000,000.^*^ Thin was
the budget as presented by Krestinski, the Soviet finance Commissar.
It did not represent the real financial condition of tho.t govern-
ment for 1918 for several reasons. The January-June budget was
criticized for having omitted the account of the operations of the
chief productive organ,- the Supreme Soviet of National Economy,
and the people's Food Commissariat. These two departments, as v/ill
be shown by the 1919 budget in items, occupy very important posi-
tions in the Russian budget. It is alleged that these defects were
due to the fact that the budget v;as gotten up in the irmnediate v/ake
"1
of the revolution.^ The budget for the July-December period also
failed to show a complete picture of the financial operation of the
government. The ITood Commissariat and the Supreme Council of nat-
ional Econom^y disposed of their receipts as their own special re-
sources apart from the general budget. The deficit for the July-
December 1919 period was in reality over 25,000,000,000 rubles, and
80
not 16,344,000,000, as the budget estimated. The reason was that
of the expected receipts, only a fraction was actually collected,
and fully ten billion was counted on from practically uncollectable
taxes. This ten billion was in the form of capital levy, of which
op
only 979, 159, 273, rubles, or less than one tenth, was paid up.
80. Prom the Special Correspondence of the ITew York Evening Post
from Amsterdam, November 22, 1919.
81. United States of America State Department Memorandum on Cert-
ain Aspects of the Bolshevist Movem.ent in Russia, p. 39.
82. Prom the Berlin "Vorwarts" , date not mentioned.
727^ruble3, leaving a deficit of 14,750,000^ ^P
rubles •
Tor the July-December
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To sun up the financial situation of 1913 from the various statements
ciuoted above, there xias in round numbers a receipt of six 'oillion
rubles against an expenditure of 46'3 billion, leaving an annual def-
icit of 40 billion rubles.
The budget for the first half of 1919 is now published in full
in the ^'emorandum of the State Departr.ient of the United States of
Araerica. It shows all the state expenditures and receipts. The^z
are as follows
:
Receipts : Rubles
1. Direct tajies 1,752,001,980
2. Indirect taxes 2,572,184,000
S. Customs 97,959,100
4. State regalia 810,696,500
5. State property 14,789,269,565
6. Reimbursement of expenses of state
treasury --------------- 65,659,925
7. Miscellaneous 277,877,020
Total 20,543,627,888
Disbursements: Rubles
1. All-Russian Central Executive Committee 459,156,742
2. Office of Council of people's Conn-nissaries 842,945
3. Coi^jriissariat for foreign Affairs - - - - 11,400,000
4. Commissariat for Affairs of Nationalities 16,7145557
5. Comjuissariat for Internal Affairs - - - 655,542,712
G. Comjuissariat for Education 5,887,995,727
7. Comiaissariat for Labor 280,316,069
8. Comar.issariat for Public Health 1,227,854,0^^7
9. Commiissariat for Social T/elfare 1,619,130,905
10. Cormnissariat for -Justice - -- -- -- - 250,525,251
11. Commissariat for Finances ------- 1,403,604,258
12. Supremie Soviet of ITa,tional Economy - - - 5,315.951,055
15. Commissariat for Agriculture ------ 532,725,811
14. Coimnissariat for Pood 8,152,880,527
83. United states of America State Department Mem.orandum on Cert-
ain Aspects of the Bolshevist Movemxent in Russia, p. 39-40.
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Dis "burservients - Continued. Ru"bles
15. Conii:iissariat for Coimnerce and Industry - 302,007.888
16. ConmiisGariat for Means of Conuiiunication 5 9078,906,230
17. Cormnissarlat for Poet and Teleg-raph 573.103,010
18. Coianissariat for I'ilitary Affairs 12,149,770,487
19. COiTiP.iissariat for llaval Affairs 521,068,892
20. Coinmissariat for State Control 107,599,080
21. Central Statistical Office 69,119,000
2?J
. All-Russian Evacuation Coirjiiission - - - 55,800,000
23. Aii-RuGsian Extraordinary Coimission to
Combat Counter-Revolution, etc. - - - 348,858,215
24. To liquidate Annulled Loans 100,181,020
25. Interest on debt to People's Bank by
treasury 1,625,617,000
26. Expenses of nationalization and office
of S.8.N.E. 5,162,625,009
27. Expenses of local Soviets -------- 201,456,567
88. Appropriations for extraordinary expenses 800,000,000
Total 50,702,627,832
The items in this budget show remarkably well hov/ a socialist
government functions. It is a picture of the economic life of a
socialist coLimunitj'-. On the credit side the largest income is state
property, which is three-fourths of the whole receipts. This means
that the state owns every means of production. On the debit side,,
besides the single item of 12 billion for the Military Affairs, the
largest single item is the 8 billion for the Food ComiTiissariat
.
This means that the state is .the largest distributor and feeder of
the population. Another very important fact is the amount reached
by combining the various items v/hioh might be considered as directly
or indirectly productive in nature. The combined amount for items
7,12,13,15,16,17,26, is 17.38 billion in round numbers, or more than
one-third of the total expenditure. This means that the state is
the chief producer of economic goods.
A comparative table prepared from the statements quoted above ;
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sxiovving the percentage that the deficit "bears to the disbursement
for 1S18 and the first half of 1919, is as follows (stated in "bil-
lion ru"bles)
:
Receipts Expenditures Deficit % of Deficit to expend
1918
J"an. -June 2.8 17.6 14.8 84
Jul. -Dec. 4.0 29.0 25.0 86
1919
Jan. -June £0.3 50.7 30.4 60
27.1 97.3 71.2
The table shows that the financial situation of the Soviet
government in the surmner of 1919 was decidedly "better than in the
previous surmner. This is extremely improbable in view of the condi-
tions existing in Soviet Russia in 1919. In the summer of that j'-ear
the very existence of the governrrient v/as being threatened bjr the
closing in of enemies from all directions. There is no reason to
believe that production was greater in that year than it had been
previously, nor transportation better. On the other hand we have
every reason to believe the contrary. The biggest item of receipts,
the state property, is unreliable, because the same item was valued
at 50,000,000 rubles in the two previous budgets. If this is the
case, the shrinking on the receipt side further expanded the deficit
by many more billions, as in the case of the July-December period of
1918. This would bring the grand total of the deficit for January-
July 1919 to an amount much higher than 71.2 billion rubles. The
84. 5'rom the Berlin "Vorwarts", date not mentioned.

r>n
facts presentod in the following paragraph "bear out this view.
To meet the enormous deficit, the Soviet government has had
recourse to the issuing of paper money. The amount in circulation
has heen placed at various figures. The "EconomicheskajT'a Zhizn" of
the Supreme Council of national Economy in May 21. 12 19, gave the
follov;ing figures (in million ruhles):®^
Issues hefore the Revolution (j'arch 1917) 9,950
Issued by the Kerensky government --------- 8,967
Issued by Bolsheviks to January 1919 ------- 36,353
55,270
But the circulation was 80 milliard rubles, which v/as perhaps nearer
O A
the truth in view of the 71.2 billion rubles deficit. The propor-
tion of gold reserve to these notes is not known. It is estimated
that the gold reserve for S,456^rubles in the earlier note issues of
Russia, exclusive of the Bolsheviks notes and the Kerensky notes,
was only 3.5;;^. The proportion of gold reserve to the entire note
circulation must be infinitesimally small.
4. Education Under Boviet Governinant .
The achievements of the ooviet government in the field of educ-
ation establish beyond a doubt how well a government determined to
work for the welfare of the people can do even in a short time and
under very unfavorable circumstances. The Soviet government's budget
84. From the Berlin "Yorwarts", date not mentioned.
85. United States of America State Department I.lemorandum on Certain
Aspects of the Bolshevist Movement in Russia, p. 16.
85. Literary Digest, March 13, 1920.
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for 1919 might be estiinated at 100 billion rubles, basing it on the
budget for the first half of that year, v/hich was published at 50
billion rubles. For the same year the education budget was 20 bil-
o 7lion rubles, or one-fifth of the whole year's budget. This figure
alone bespeaks the attachment of the Soviet government to the real
interest of the Russian people. The result was the accomplishment of
a seeming impossibility. The territory in which the Soviet govern-
ment is functioning was a part of that empire called "Dark Russia"
under the Czarist regime. The Russian people were shown to be very
ignorant, approximately 60^ illiterate, and even superstitious. The
"mujik", in his simplicity and ignorance of learning, was the anti-
thesis of the Czarist nobility and the intelligentsia, with their
elegant culture, learning and sophistication. Under the combined
politico-religious system of Russia, knowledge was looked upon as
undesirable for the m.asses. Recent information given by the Soviet
Commission for Education showed that in the region controlled by
Soviet Russia there were, before the revolution, more than 100,000,
000 illiterates. Today the illiteracy is decreasing at a surprising
rate. The Commissar of Education, Mr. Lunatchavsky' s statement is:
"Before the revolution there v/ere more than 100,
000,000 illiterates in that part of Russia now control-
led by the Soviets. Hoy; many of these have learned to
read and write in the past two years I cannot say, for
accurate statistics covering the whole country are
lacking. This we know, however, and that is that where
there were originally scarcely 15:"; of literate Red
soldiers there are nov/ nearly 60^.
"In the ITavy where the percentage of illiteracy
was almost as high as in the Army, there is virtually
87. Lincoln Eyre's Correspondence for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
from Paris, March 24, 1920.
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none. We know, too, that v;here two years ago Petrograd
nmiibered 30^ of illiterates among its population (two
million), she now numbers only 60,000, or about 8%
(population now more than 1,000,000) Continuing at this
rate of progress, she will have none whatever six
months hence. I don't hesitate to predict that in three
years there v/ill be no more illiteracy throughout the
v/hole length and breadth of the Soviet Republic."
In .the field of primary education the task of the Soviet gov-
erniaent was not only to teach the children but also to cloth and
feed them and supply them with text-books and stationery. In 1919
the government gave to the children 9,400,000 pairs of shoes, and
distributed books to 2,500,000 pupils. The age of compulsory educ-
ation is from 8 to IS. The educational progress is nation-wide in
character. In the Tver government the number of schools increased
from 2800 in 191S to 3400 at the beginning of 1920. The scholars
increased from 130,000 to 278,000 in the saiTie period, and the nuraber
of instructors was more than tripled. Even in far Turkestan the
number of children receiving a first-grade education climbed from
40,000 to 120,000, and that of the teachers from 2,000 to 5,000.
The supply of teachers of elementary education is now no longer in a
critical state.
In secondary education the problem is not yet solved. The
Soviet government looked upon the secondary education as a means to
serve tv/o purposes. In the first place, it v/as in secondary educa-
tion that it v;as desired to instil into the minds of the pupils the
principles of Comjnunism. They wis^^ied to develop their instruction
on the principles of Coiimiunism- to a considerable extent. Secondly,
87. Lincoln Eyre's Correspondence for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Paris, March 24, 1920.
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it v;as planned to "begin the rudimentary exercise of the soviet form
of government in the secondary school. In other words, a secondary
school is to be a soviet in which the management is carried on, not
"by the teacher alone > "but by a coiTiaittee composed of teachers, re-
presentatives of the children's parents, and delegates of over 12
years of age from the pupils, and an envoy of the local branch of
the Commissariat of Education. The difficulties arise from these two
prerequisites of the Soviet program of secondary education. In the
first instance the teachers cannot instil Communist principles unless
they are themselves Cormnunists or sufficiently in sjniipathy with it.
In the beginning teachers who were opposed to Communism and ready to
antagonize it in the secondary schools were firmly dealt with by the
Soviet government. Thej'- now shov; only passive resistance. In the
second instance the teachers were too conservative to adapt them-
selves to the new theory of Soviet govermnsnt in the school. They
were teachers accustomed to the old methods of the Czarist days, and
depended on physical rather than moral force to carry on their in-
struction. The Soviet government has made vigorous efforts to es-
tablish a considerable nuLiber of centers for the training of teachers
87for secondar:'' schools, but the supply is still inadequate.
In higher education the progress is also remarkable. Under the
Czar there were seven universities; at present there are seventeen.
There are also Peasants' Universities, which are special schools
dealing with agronomy and other subjects of iimiiediate interest to
the farmers.
87. Lincoln Eyre's Correspondence for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
Paris, March 24, 1920.
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Another educational activity has been the estahlishiient of
schools for the study of Cormunism. There v/as opened on relDrnar3r 1.
1920, the so-called Sverdloff University. Students from all Russia
who desire to gain a thorough insight into the Coimunist doctrines
from the political, social and economic points of viev/ attend. This
University is designed primarily to train the exponents of Communism
and world revolution. The Catherine Institute of Moscow is devoted
to similar purposes.^'''
The Soviet government also undertook vigorous measures to
teach adults to read and write. In every school, "both in city and
in country, there were certain hours set aside when the school was
reserved for the use of adults. The ability to read and write
became an obligation; and those v/ho could not do so v/ere req.uired to
qualify themiselves within a certain length of time. If by the end
of this time limit one v;as still unable to do so, he was subject to
trial by the revolutionary tribunal. Under this rule bearded peas-
ants had to learn the alphabet and its use from, their children under
pain of losing their vote.
Finally there was introduced a type of propagandist education.
Very notable in this sort of education was lime. Angelica Balabanova,
secretary of the Third Internationale. Her work was with the peas-
antry. She had a train of ten cars eq.uipped with libraries, cine-
matographs, printing press, wireless, and other eq[uipmient, and on
which were painted such inscriptions as "All Powers to the Soviets",
"V/orkers of the YJorld Unite", and allegorical scenes of the struggle
87. Lincoln Eyre's Correspondence for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
froir. Paris, March 24, 1980.
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between capitalism and the proletariate, and the triumph of the
latter. At one time there were five such trains in operation. Their
directors travelled about the countrj'- and preached Communism to the
peasants
.
5 . Evolution of the Communist Party Since 1917 .
It is said that the Soviet government has had little chance to
beautify their capital city. A few comiTion statues of Karl Marx have
been put up in IIoscov/ to perpetuate the memory of the great apostle
of socialism.. Yet socialism in the Soviet Russia of today, after two
years operation under the very shadow of its founder, is anything
but pure socialism.. The Bolsheviks started with the idea of the
worlonen's control in the form of factory committees, and the result
was still greater industrial chaos, decrease of efficiency, and ulti-
m.ately an econom.ic debacle. The authorities v/ere forced to abolish
the workr.ien's comjiiittee in the factories and finally to adopt the
conscription of labor, with revolutionarj'' tribunals for the enforce-
88
ment of discipline. The Bolsheviks had also stood for the nation-
alization of the land, but the peasants generally refused to admit
the principle, and especially the relatively sF^all class of v/ell-to-
do peasants which had been fostered by the old regime on the basis
of priv9.te ownership. The regime of Lenin is a proletarian dictator-
ship, but as a matter of fact it is the dictatorship of one man.
Lenin is the dictator and has dominated the Russian people by his
ability to guage their purposes by his will, his intellect, and his
88. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 17, 1920.
I
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capacity for adjustment under rapidl3/ changing circumstances. There-
fore the dictatorship of the proletariate numbering 35;; of Russia's
population, results in the real dictatorship of one man. Starting
with the idea of an internationalism that recognized no national
boundarj'- lines, the Bolsheviks have won a successful v/ar by appeal-
ing to the nationalistic instinct of Russia.
The inconsistencies between the professions and the practices
of the Soviet leaders could bo illustrated still farther. Soviet
leaxiers recognized this in the most unreserved fashion. Mr. Krasin,
Soviet Commissar of Commerce, declared, "Who still believes in Soc-
90ialism in Russia? Anj/how, neither I nor Lenin". Krasin is prac-
tical and businesslike, a man of affo-irs. He personifies the ten-
dency of the evolution of Sovietism towards the right. It was
Krasin who suggested to Lenin all the appeals to the workmen in
behalf off discipline. It was Krasin v/ho upheld the viev/ that Soc-
ialist Russia can only develop v/ith foreign capital, and planned
90important concessions to foreign business interests. Whatever
reasons may be advanced for such deviations, it is an undeniable
fact that during tv/o and a half years of its existence the Soviet
89. "The victory of Denikine or Kolchak would mean the loss of
Russia's independence and the turning of Russia into a milk
oo\'i for English and French money bags. In this sense the
government of Denikine and Kolehak is the m.ost anti-popular,
the m:0st anti-national government; in this sense the Soviet
government is the only popular, the only national government
(in the best sense of the word)" - The Manchester Guardian,
date not m^entioned.
90. ?or Lc Temps, reprinted in Few Europe.
I
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governiiient has revealed marvellous gifts for eonprornise. The hist-
ory of these yearQ is one of compromisec^s on professed principles
under the exigency of circumstances. Hov/ far the Soviet government
will continue in the direction of compromise, only later develop-
ments will demonstrate. But in the political life of a country one
must take into consideration the hidden forces that often come into
play quite unexpectedly and determine the direction of its progress.
In Russia these unlcnovm forces may be the continuing awakening of
the people, the gradual econoriic development, or the em^ergence into
pov/er of the peasantry. As it is today the fortunes of the Soviet
government are bound up with the evolution of the Communist Party,
to v;hich its authority and power have been comimitted. Mr. John
Claj^i^on testified in the follov/ing way as to what is behind this
seeming inconsistenc3?' of the Soviet government: (Hoscov/, April 14,
1920) "Grouped with Trotzky are the more radical elem^ents of the
party, who look v/ith consternation on the abandonment of principles
on which they believed the bolshevik group had been founded
Lenin, on the other hand, v/hile working for the same ideals - the
abolition of what he styled the capitalistic oligarchy - knows that
in order to live the Soviet Party must conform itself to conditions
met in practice, that conditions are too inflexible to shape to
ideals, and that ideals m.ust be shaped to meet the problemis of gov-
crniT.ent which have arisen under the new order in Russia. The event-
91
ual trium;ph of the Lenin group seemiS inevitable."
91. Chicago Daily Tribune, April 30, 1920, p. 2.
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Thi8 chapter on the operation of the Soviet government is
intended to serve as a partial expression of the conclT^sions v/hich
anyone interested in Russia is naturally tempted to make. But it is
very hard to reach a completeness or finality of Judgment nov;.
There is still much to he knov/n, and the circumstojices under which
many of the measures of the Soviet government were taken have been
very extraordinary. YJhen one vier/s the operation of that government
from the efficienc]'" of its public defense, the determination to
enlighten the ignorant Russian mujik by means of an extensive educa-
tional program, the success that it has had in winning over the
peasantry, one cannot fail to be impressed 'oy its honesty of purpose.
Regarding the Bolsheviki, there has been available too much untruth,
both in praise and denunciation, and too meager a body of facts,
nothing will help any country except the truth. In my attempt to
reach conclusions, I have presented such data as can be made the
basis of tentative judgments. Whether one thinks the existence of
the Soviet government has been justified or not, one cannot regret
that the Russian people were Y/illing to try the experiment a.nd ex-
plore unknown regions of political, social, and economic order in
search of a sovereign remedy for present-day unrest.
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